



ASSESSMENT OF
**GUN VIOLENCE
REDUCTION INITIATIVES**
PHILADELPHIA



Philadelphia

SUMMARY

NICJR's analysis seeks to assess and recommend improvements very specifically to reduce shootings and homicides in Philadelphia in the near term (6-24 months). These improvements will likely have ongoing impacts to reduce gun violence for additional years, but the goal of this assessment and series of recommendations is to establish a strategy that can significantly reduce gun violence as soon as possible.

The City of Philadelphia government, including the police department, has had numerous external assessments and evaluations conducted in the past few years. Many of those assessments are well done and have good recommendations. Implementation and execution of those recommendations remains to be seen. Philadelphia does not lack in knowing what needs to be done, but there is a significant gap in doing what needs to be done.

There are some very promising and very good community services and law enforcement oriented initiatives; however, efforts operate in isolation and suffer due to missing coordination, collaboration, and communication. As one government official told NICJR during a series of interviews conducted for this assessment, "expect that no one initiative is connected to another."





The City of Philadelphia needs a citywide strategy that is focused on reducing gun violence in the near term (the next 6-24 months). A strategy that is appropriately resourced, well managed, and intensively engaged with the people accurately identified as being at very high risk of gun violence is needed but does not yet exist.

For the Philadelphia Police Department (PPD), an enormous amount of high quality intelligence is collected, synthesized, and distributed. That valuable intelligence is not well coordinated, not operationalized, assignments are not generated from them, and there is little to no measurable response from the intel that is shared.

The current community services/intervention programs lack the level of specificity and intensity that is needed to effectively engage individuals at very high risk of gun violence. To be effective, programs should target individuals who are at a high risk of being involved in gun violence, as identified through a legitimate data-driven assessment process. These individuals require intensive engagement, including daily communication, multiple in-person connections per week, and the development and resourcing of a personalized Life Plan/Case Plan.

Philadelphia

INITIATIVE SNAPSHOTS

Below is a sampling of Philadelphia Initiatives to Reduce Violence:

Operation Pinpoint

PPD's Operation Pinpoint is a multifaceted crime fighting and information sharing strategy designed to identify, collect, analyze, and disseminate information that officers and commanders need to target the most violent offenders and the most impacted areas. Combining "hot-spot" policing, offender focus, problem-solving, and community policing, along with using data, technology, and on-the-ground experience, this strategy "pinpoints" the most violent offenders and neighborhood attractors for crime; and operates in conjunction with the community, within the most volatile targeted areas.

Place Network Investigations (PNI)

Piloted in Districts 15, 16, 18, and 24, the PNI effort views crime as a complex societal problem that is best addressed through a coordinated all-city response. Through strategic investigation and deployment of existing city resources, this coordinated citywide effort is focused on dismantling crime place networks and disrupting these offender networks operating in selected locations. This focused police investigative approach, working in collaboration with the PNI Board (22 city agencies and stakeholders) staffed with a diverse set of department heads will: 1) prioritize objectives and responsibilities to residents; 2) create effective systems to address community concerns, and 3) eliminate silos to leverage and maximize impact of existing resources. The response of and by the entire PNI Board will determine the level of success achieved through this effort.

Public Safety Partnership

As part of this partnership, PPD will receive intensive training and technical assistance (TTA) from DOJ in the areas of gun violence, criminal justice collaboration, investigations, constitutional policing, community engagement, federal partnerships, crime analysis, and technology to identify, assess, and implement collaborative strategies and a lasting coordination structure to prevent and combat violent crime, especially related to gun, drug, and gang violence. PSP supports DOJ's commitment to advancing work that promotes civil rights, increases access to justice, supports crime victims, protects the public from crime and evolving threats, and builds trust between law enforcement and the community.

INITIATIVE SNAPSHOTS

Joint Warrant Apprehension Taskforce

This taskforce brings together public safety agencies to pursue the city's most violent offenders ages 16 to 34 whose whereabouts are unknown with the goal of stopping future violence. A two-month pilot resulted in the arrest of seven high-risk individuals and the recovery of three illegal firearms.

Shooting Investigation Group (SIG)

The SIG is a centralized investigative team, which formed in early 2022, that performs all investigations into non-fatal shooting, working alongside homicide, who is placed immediately next door to their offices.

Group Violence Intervention Program (GVI)

GVI is designed to serve those highest at risk of committing future shootings or being a future victim. Individuals directly engaged as part of the strategy are selected through a collaborative effort between Police, Probation and the District Attorney's Office based on a collective assessment of an individual's level of risk of involvement in gun violence.



INITIATIVE ASSESSMENTS

PPD Shooting Reviews

The purpose of a Shooting Review is to provide and share real-time information on the most violently active groups and individuals in order to prevent retaliation. While solving crime may occur at a Shooting Review, this is not the primary focus. The primary focus is to stop the next shooting or homicide by preventing retaliation. Retaliation is a common and unique element of most gang/group-related shootings and other shootings and homicides perpetrated by known very high risk individuals.

Non-fatal shootings, shootings into vehicles and structures, and homicides are all discussed at Shooting Reviews. Best practice requires data to be collected for every gang/group-involved individual who is involved in a shooting or homicide. With the goal of preventing retaliation, a series of questions should be asked about every shooting incident review (questions included in the appendix).

Shooting Reviews are already taking place within PPD on a regular basis with the right people at the table lending the right information to further this initiative. The following observations and recommendations for the current Shooting Review are being made after the attendance of seven shooting reviews and rooted in assisting in efficiency and the efficacy of the work being done.

PPD's current Shooting Review is a real-time meeting of knowledgeable practitioners that tie analysis to day-to-day management of violence and serve as the foundation for the implementation of partnership-based violence reduction strategies. The foundation of the PPD shooting review is strong with the high level of command facilitating the meeting and making it clear that violence reduction is a priority. To improve on the current process it is important to be clear with the purpose and expectations of this important meeting, which should be reiterated at the beginning of every meeting.

“Non-Fatal Shooting and Gun Violence Reduction Assessment,” a September 2022 report of the Philadelphia Public Safety Partnership, conducted by a researcher from the federal Bureau of Justice Assistance, provided analysis and recommendations of the PPD Shooting Review meetings. These findings are consistent with NICJR’s assessment:

- PPD should “Define the desired outcomes of the weekly shooting review meeting and devise metrics to determine if they are achieved . . . Consider triaging for shootings with a high risk of retaliation”
- “Without clear goals, shooting reviews can decay into exercises in recitation instead of problem-solving or case quality control processes.”
- “successful initiatives, particularly in cities the size of Philadelphia (population 1.5 million), start by identifying individuals at high risk of committing gun violence, their groups, and the places prone to violence.”

An additional report conducted through the Public Safety Partnership, the Philadelphia Crime Analysis Assessment, completed in October 2022, found that the PPD “weekly shooting review has little to no use of data and analysis to drive decision-making. The shooting review and other discussions were focused solely on solving cases rather than looking at trends and patterns related to shootings and other crimes.”

See Appendix A for a more detailed assessment of PPD shooting reviews and additional recommendations for how to improve them.



Group Violence Intervention Program

The City of Philadelphia describes the Group Violence Intervention Program (GVI) as a program "designed to serve those highest at risk of committing future shootings or being a future victim. Individuals directly engaged as part of the strategy are selected through a collaborative effort between police, probation, and the district attorney's office based on a collective assessment of an individual's level of risk of involvement in gun violence."

An individual that meets all three of the following criteria are determined by the GVI program to be of high risk of being involved in gun violence:

1. The candidate possesses a relevant criminal history, has been a shooting victim, or self-identifies as a criminal group member:
 - Relevant criminal history: the GVI candidate possesses a criminal history, within the past five years, which includes arrest charges of either a violent crime, violation of the Uniform Firearms Act, or narcotics-related offenses (not including minor narcotics possession).
 - The candidate was a shooting victim: the GVI candidate has been a victim of a shooting, within the past five years.
 - The candidate self-identifies as a criminal group member: the GVI candidate has demonstrated by their own volition, within one year, that they are a member of a criminal group.
2. The candidate is associated with a violent criminal group: the police department has documented information, within one year, which associates the GVI candidate, either directly or through their direct associations (no more than one degree of separation), to a violent criminal group.
3. The candidate's associated "group" is connected to recent gun violence: the police department has collected and assessed information that the candidate's associated criminal group is directly involved in recent gun violence, within one year.

These are good criteria. The problem is that criteria are only used for candidates proposed by district captains instead of methodologically and routinely used to assess persons involved in recent shooting incidents; this process is likely missing key very high risk individuals. Several members of PPD and other city officials shared with the NICJR team that they did not think GVI was identifying the right individuals to engage. But it is also clear that many GVI identified individuals were accurately assessed as very high risk.

On Saturday mornings, Philadelphia GVI team members knock on the doors of people identified as high risk and give them a message of deterrence and offer support. The Office of Violence Prevention has case managers who engage GVI participants and connect them to needed services. In November 2022, GVI case managers had a high caseload of up to 50 cases per manager. This heavy workload hinders the existing GVI staff from providing the necessary intensive and high-quality outreach required by the program.

Additionally, GVI managers noted that “when we go out on Saturdays while we are going to a specific person’s house we are also going to the block and offer support to anyone who needs it.” While this is a great service for the city to provide, with limited resources, intensive intervention services should be strictly focused on those individuals who are at the very highest risk of being involved in gun violence.

Some PPD staff questioned whether GVI has a significant enforcement component. There is a question of the level of PPD buy-in with the program as well as whether the DAO will prosecute GVI participants who continue to engage in violence. And there was also confusion among PPD and other city officials about who runs GVI.

Although NICJR met with GVI staff and reviewed GVI reports, we were only allowed to observe one of the GVI meetings with PPD captains. There were many aspects of the GVI meeting that were impressive and promising, and other parts that were concerning. Deon Sumpter, the Director of Group Violence Intervention, is a significant asset to the City and any future effective violence reduction strategy. Deion has a strong rapport with the district Captains and a passion for the work. PPD captains appeared to trust him and were very willing to share information with Deion.

But there were other aspects of the meet that were concerning. In one district, the captain said there were many recent concerning shootings, but none were gang related so they just moved on.

Again, these discussions and referrals should be based on recent incidents/shootings, not just on the gut feeling of the captain. To be clear, much of the discussion included reference to recent shootings and gut feelings of captains are actually very valuable, but not to be relied on alone. These discussions and referrals should lead with a review of all recent shootings and then a determination of which have the highest likelihood of retaliation and that is how referrals should be made.

Important leaders within PPD expressed skepticism of not only GVI, but even human intelligence that has not been confirmed by completed investigations. And while some of this caution is understandable, there are clear problems with this perspective and lack of utilization of high quality intelligence. Some of these department officials even went so far as to say that Philadelphia does not have a gang violence problem. These perspectives seem to also show up in and skew PPD reports. For instance, a SIG report of the non-fatal, injury shootings in Philadelphia in 2022 claims that none of the 1,502 shootings last year were gang related. To be blunt, this statement is absurd and may be caused by the application or absence of a technical definition for gang or group involvement. Although NICJR feels the number may be undercounted, a recent GVI evaluation determined that 25% of all shootings in Philadelphia were gang related. Additionally, numerous recent media reports with law enforcement cite gang violence as a major issue, including this [Philadelphia Inquirer article](#) from December 2022 and this local [ABC news segment](#) from the end of 2022.

The issue here is likely one of definition in two ways. Data regarding gang and group involved offenses may be prone to miscalculation due to overly narrow definitions of "gang or group crime." Some gangs are easily defined due to commonly known hierarchical structures, formal names, defined territories, and easily discoverable and widely understood artifacts. But many of today's groups, cliques, and crews are often new, formed within the last few years and quickly change names, may not be tied to a specific geography and are loose net, without much structure. They are hard to formally certify within outdated gang classification systems. Other groups are more neighborhood cliques

that may have been around a while but may not even consider themselves as a gang, but are groups of people who often commit crime and associate under a particular name or brand, sometimes the name of the neighborhood.

A second issue that can lead to miscalculation is how and when to attribute a shooting offense to a known gang or group member. This is even more challenging for people to understand. What NICJR has found in many cities throughout the country is that group/crew/gang involvement is a huge risk factor for gun violence, not necessarily a causation. Meaning, people who are associated or members of these groups are often victims and suspects in shootings, but the motive of the shooting was not always a gang on gang conflict. In fact, the majority of shootings seems to be precipitated by a fight over a young woman and/or a petty dispute on social media.

So if "John" from the "Get Money Crew" that formed two years ago and is not known by the investigator of the shooting where John shot and injured a young man he was in conflict with for dating his ex-girlfriend, that shooting would not be classified as a gang related shooting. But that incident needs to be counted as a "group-involved" shooting so we can better document, track, and understand how many shootings involve members of groups/crews/gangs, regardless of the cause or motive.

CompStat

CompStat is a well-known policing management model designed to instill a culture of data-informed leadership, collaborative problem-solving, and focused precision to proactively address crime rather than arbitrarily reacting to crime as it occurs. Short for "Computer" or "Comparative Statistics," CompStat requires organizational accountability for the use of data and statistics in designing, implementing, adjusting, and evaluating meaningful public safety strategies. Police commanders are responsible for the resulting tactics, the performance of their personnel, and for measurable outcomes as reviewed within predictably scheduled and held CompStat meetings.

A successful CompStat process encompasses four essential principles; a deficit within one area will negatively impact the whole.

1. Accurate and Timely Data: Crime analysis statistics, crime intelligence, and other information to identify crime trends and conditions quickly and accurately.
2. Effective Strategies and Tactics: The ability to devise effective and data-informed public safety strategies and supporting tactics.
3. Deployment of Personnel and Collaborations The availability of capable personnel with resources and collaborations to carry out the plan quickly and as intended.
4. Accountability: Follow-through to direct activities and assess outcomes with predictable accountability at all levels within the chain of command.

Lastly – and more importantly – a successful CompStat process requires the presence of a well-established and communicated vision to achieve desired public safety goals. When the above essential principles are in place, leadership values CompStat for the produced unity of effort success requires.

Although the Philadelphia Police Department has used CompStat for more than 20 years, the department’s 2020 Crime Prevention & Violence Reduction Action Plan prioritized a restructuring of CompStat as a key performance goal. The department also established fundamental CompStat related objectives such as the use of daily district priorities, district weekly priorities, weekly shooting review meetings, and quarterly district strategies as means of developing, documenting, communicating, and directing coordinated efforts to reduce homicides, shootings, and serious or violent crime.

NICJR evaluated each principle within the department’s CompStat process by way of document requests, interviews with key personnel, and direct observation of a CompStat oriented command meeting in which CompStat goals and expectations for 2023 were communicated to department leadership.

Accurate and Timely Data:

The Philadelphia Police Department Crime Analysis Unit's (CAU) capabilities are impressive. With recently added staff and functionality, CAU statistics, reports, and data appear to be routinely produced and regularly disseminated; however, it is unclear how CAU capabilities and expertise currently add value to the CompStat process and related strategies. The CompStat command meeting stressed the importance of timely and relevant data, but the NICJR team observed inconsistent uses of data that appeared to coincide with any given leader's discretion, resources, or abilities.

For example, "Operation Pinpoint" is the department's stated strategy to reduce homicides and non-fatal shootings through focus, planning, data-driven action, and assessment. The NICJR team concurs with a recent evaluation of PPD by the National Public Safety Partnership that found limited use of data and analysis within Pinpoint. When Pinpoint grids were mentioned within a CompStat context, it was widely stated that resources and personnel were insufficient to adequately address all Pinpoint grids. This message – and the apparent reality it reflects – is antithetical to the culture of accountability CompStat is meant to impose.

"While the idea of Pinpoint as a hot spot policing strategy is good, based on the meetings with commanders and district personnel, the use of data and analysis to drive the implementation appears to be minimal."

– Julie Wartell
National Public Safety Partnership

Effective Strategies and Tactics:

The purpose of a documented strategy is to orient required personnel and resources toward a general plan of action to achieve a defined departmental goal. Tactics are then directed for specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and timebound mission essential tasks for success. Crime plans and their priorities—whether contained in a quarterly, weekly, or daily format – encompass both necessary and essential components. The NICJR team learned that quarterly district strategies, district weekly priorities, and daily priorities do not

exist in formal or uniformly documented manners, and there are no plans to require them. Tasks to subordinate units are undoubtedly communicated to personnel by different means through different channels, but such direction doesn't appear to be consistently documented or evaluated throughout the department. It is also evident that the department views some currently employed tactics as ineffective (such as directed patrol) when assignments fail to direct and require meaningful, relevant, and proactive activities. Interviews with key personnel often produced stated concern regarding personnel shortages along with dichotomous opinions that personnel deployments are not widely regarded as productive or efficient.

The CompStat command meeting stressed the need for police district crime reduction goals but there was no apparent requirement to align goals to established department priorities or overall strategy. This high degree of freedom may produce individual successes for districts while also compromising the department's overall success.

Quick and Efficient Deployment of Personnel and Collaborations:

Again, the department's current personnel shortage was commonly cited as an obstacle to providing sufficient time within patrol shifts to carry out crime reduction plans as intended. Compounding the problem of personnel shortages is the issue of persistent serious and violent crime. This imbalance makes preventative and proactive efforts difficult given the obligation to respond to crime as it occurs. With this reality in mind, the purpose of "pinpoint grids" is to prioritize and focus the best of public safety efforts within neighborhoods experiencing disproportionate shares of public safety harm.

"If everything's a priority then nothing's a priority."


– A PPD Official

Pilot projects for initial pinpoint grid neighborhoods produced promising results and the number of citywide locations was subsequently expanded from four beginning grids to today's forty-five locations. Some police districts now contain as many as five pinpoint grids. The NICJR team received consistent feedback from various levels and assignments that resources, time, and attention have consequentially been stretched too thin.

Relentless Follow-up, Assessment, and Accountability:

The CompStat command meeting stressed the importance of accountability at all levels of the department to ensure what is planned to be done is accomplished. Expectations also rightfully identified the recognition of personnel and the obligation to gain community trust as important components of an accountable culture.

Regularly scheduled morning crime briefings and bi-weekly CompStat meetings were frequently canceled during the NICJR evaluation period. A commitment to accountability is required on a daily- if not hourly- basis as the landscape of crime consistently evolves and therefore constantly requires awareness, assessment, adaptability, and action. CompStat is designed to culminate predictable accountability at high levels, but true accountability is realized through the constant interactions, meetings, briefings, directives, and processes that cause focus outside of CompStat itself. Daily crime briefings, weekly shooting reviews, shift line-ups, and quality supervision and command are intrinsically linked to the CompStat process by how well emerging crime trends and patterns are identified, how well resources are effectively deployed throughout a 24-hour period, and the collaborative quality of multiple programs operating together for a common goal.



Place Network Investigations (PNI)

Place Network Investigations (PNI) is a citywide strategy that uses intelligence-based policing and collaborative problem-solving to target a specific geographic area. The approach examines the interconnected nature of crime within the area, including the relationships between locations, individuals, activities, gangs, or groups. The goal of PNI is to disrupt criminal networks and reduce crime in the area using a multifaceted approach that goes beyond relying solely on enforcement measures. When enforcement measures are necessary, PNI uses intelligence-led policing to make informed decisions about when, where, and how to deploy law enforcement resources. This approach allows for precise policing strategies that target specific public safety risks and individuals, rather than being potentially experienced as an over-policing of entire neighborhoods. The promise of PNI is that sustainable crime reduction can be achieved by strengthening and improving¹ communities and ultimately reducing the need for traditional police responses in the future. The PNI strategy was launched in 2021 under Philadelphia's Roadmap to Safer Communities under which the Philadelphia Police Department's Crime Reduction and Violence Prevention Plan operates.

Though requested, the NICJR team was unable to attend a PNI operational meeting but gained insights into the program through PPD interviews and review of a recently delivered PPD PNI presentation. Coordinated through the Mayor's Office of Policy and Strategic Initiatives for Criminal Justice and Public Safety, Philadelphia's PNI program brings together the Philadelphia Police Department, other city departments, community members, community-based organizations, and additional state, county, and local agencies. The PNI strategy is implemented within four of Philadelphia's highest crime police districts. PPD district command and staff attend centrally.

PNI Board Meetings include investigation, analysis, and discussion from multiple stakeholders' viewpoints and experiences. Attendees are challenged to think about very specific locations within the identified PNI area and to identify how problems beyond crime itself may contribute to neighborhood harm. Possible solutions aim to improve the "place dynamics" of locations in creative ways through citywide and community team efforts. While law enforcement may be necessary to hold individual actors accountable for criminal activity at a specific location, the PNI program encourages and sustains legitimate and improved uses of the space through other facets of the strategy.

¹ HOME | PNI (placenetorkinvestigations.com)

Those familiar with PNI board meetings and the responsive deliverables they produce have advised that the meeting is well-managed with specific deliverables assigned, documented, transparently shared, and scheduled for future follow-up and accountability.

The PNI program, as described and structured, appears to embody the essence of Philadelphia's vision for public safety program success: organized, collaborative, proactive, data-informed, and focused with accountability for meaningful results. Philadelphia's PNI program represents best practices in design, and Philadelphia's PNI program is one of several promising examples of PNI nationwide.

Although PNI was launched in 2021, its implementation was delayed or interrupted until it was relaunched in the first quarter of 2022. It appears that coordination, ownership, and accountability for PNI within the police department was lacking at a high level until a transfer or delegation of authority occurred in or about August 2022. Additionally, recent reassignments of PPD command in February 2023 have underscored the need to maintain the long-term focus and commitment that PNI requires, regardless of police district command. It's worth noting that turnover is an inevitable occurrence in all city departments and positions, which underscores the benefits of a centrally organized program at the city level, within the Office of Policy and Strategic Initiatives.

After reviewing a recent PNI project presentation by the 24th District, it became clear that the program can demonstrate success, progress, and promise. The PPD presentation showcased the importance of planning, delegation, and accountability for specific strategies and tactics. Additionally, the PNI project emphasized the value of community partnerships and the importance of supervision and command delegation and accountability. Law enforcement efforts showed effective collaboration among various PPD units, shifts, assignments, and investigators, as well as federal partners. Crime and performance data was collected, tracked, and assessed, showing a correlation between focused PNI efforts and a reduction in certain serious and violent crime.

Furthermore, PNI-related misdemeanor arrests for non-violent offenses have been accompanied by the PPD's commitment to an Office of the District Attorney diversion program called the Accelerated Misdemeanor Program (AMP).

This program aims to promote fairness, individual justice, and appropriate responses to unlawful behavior by diverting offenders from traditional criminal justice processes. However, data on AMP program referrals, successful program enrollment, and outcomes are reportedly not provided to the PPD for the benefit of tracking.

While PNI shows a lot of promise as an evidence-based strategy, its success, like many other initiatives, depends on continuously focused efforts and follow-through. During the NICJR team's evaluation of the program, we encountered unexpected challenges in gathering information about its status and sustained use. With the exception of a limited amount of data for one police district for a limited period of time, quantitative measurements to assess effectiveness were planned but not yet available."

Our recommendations regarding PNI are in the "Recommendations" section of this report.

Shooting Investigation Group (SIG)

The SIG is a centralized investigative team, which formed in early 2022, that performs all investigations into non-fatal shootings, working alongside homicide, which is placed immediately next door to their offices. The unit has a captain, four lieutenants, four to six sergeants and about 40 detectives who focus exclusively on incidents of gunfire in which victims survive.

Shooting cases had previously been handled geographically, with detectives in districts also responsible for investigating other felonies. Having detectives focused on just investigating non-fatal, injury shootings can significantly improve the quality of such investigations and increase the clearance rates.

In the "Philadelphia Nonfatal Shooting and Gun Violence Reduction Assessment" report conducted through the Public Safety Partnership (PSP), it was noted that:

"High-quality investigations conducted by properly trained investigators will yield higher case-closed rates. Integrating trauma-informed policing into the SIG investigative response will support victims, witnesses, and families and encourage information sharing among law enforcement and the PDAO [Philadelphia District Attorney's Office]."

NICJR's review of SIG was limited to interviews with key personnel, but NICJR supports the findings of the PSP report. The following findings were congruent with information received by NICJR:

- “Case file summaries of [non-fatal shooting] incidents lacked detail; investigative reports were often fragmented and difficult to follow; running timeline narratives were infrequent.”
- “Not all NFS scenes are properly secured and supervised. Initial offense reports often lack relevant details, and no major crime on-scene preliminary investigation checklist for the patrol districts is currently in practice.”
- “SIG investigators should be well-versed in investigative techniques, witness management, social media scanning, open source and restricted databases, video recovery techniques, cell phone forensics, NIBIN linkages, crime scene management and documentation, relevant federal and state laws, and other relevant topics determined by the PPD. Ideally, SIG training should be continual; while the elements of an NFS investigation—motive, means, and opportunity—are unlikely to change, the methods and techniques will as technology evolves, criminals adapt, and case law decisions are handed down.”
- “Since patrol units are generally the first on scene, their interactions must be purposeful and documentable for subsequent investigations.”
 - In interviews with key personnel, NICJR also heard that patrol officers were not being properly utilized and there was even some sentiment that patrol officers are not capable of collecting information or conducting interviews that could be helpful to investigators.

Detailed recommendations on how to improve the SIG can be found in Appendix B.

Initiative Fatigue

One of the most legitimate arguments made by several city staff members is that there are too many separate violence reduction initiatives competing for limited resources, including time, staffing, funding, and effort. As a result, none of the following initiatives are as effective as they could be with a tightened and clearly defined focus:

- Operation Pinpoint
- Group Violence Intervention (GVI)
- Public Safety Partnership (PSP)
- Community Crisis Intervention Program (CCIP)
- 54 Block Initiative
- Rapid Employment and Development Initiative (READI)
- Hospital-based violence intervention programs (HVIPs)
- Cure Violence
- Street Outreach (Philadelphia Ceasefire)
- City Grant Programs
 - Anti-Violence Community Expansion Grant program (CGE)
 - Targeted Community Investment Grant program (TCIG)
- Kensington Initiative



Assessing Risk and Identifying those at The Highest Risk of Gun Violence

Several different programs and initiatives in Philadelphia assess risk of gun violence or claim to focus on those at very highest risk of violence, including:

- **Group Violence Intervention Program (GVI):** claims to focus on the highest risk groups/gangs driving gun violence (the GVI criteria was included earlier in the report).
- **Harm Risk Score:** A PPD assessment that has not been fully implemented yet but appears to be promising if coordinated with these other efforts.
- **Community Crisis Intervention Program (CCIP):** The City initiative operated by the community organization PAAN, CCIP reportedly serves people “most likely to be victims of shootings or shooters”. The City commissioned evaluation of CCIP showed that there is no consistent process being used to assess risk. There does appear to be an improvement of this since the evaluation came out.
- **Rapid Employment and Development Initiative (READI):** Replicated from a successful program out of Chicago, Philadelphia intends to Launch a READI program in the city that will use an algorithm based on PPD data to identify individuals at very high risk of gun violence to be referred for community based services, including cognitive behavioral therapy and employment services.
- **Joint Warrant Apprehension Task Force (JWAT):** Joint Warrant Apprehension Task Force (JWAT): This law enforcement initiative purportedly “goes after the city’s most violent offenders age 16-34”. From what we could glean, the “most violent” is determined by the type of warrant someone has, not the risk level of the individual. For instance, an older individual with no previous criminal history who commits a surprising homicide then flees would be a target of the JWAT but a young man who has a probation violation warrant who is steeped in a group conflict, who has all the very high risk factors and is believed to be searching for his rival would not be on JWAT’s list.
- **Weekly Intelligence Bulletin (sometimes bi-weekly):** A report from the PPD Intelligence Unit/DVIC that summarizes intelligence gathered over the past week on shootings and which have a likelihood of retaliation. These reports have been streamlined in response to requests from command staff but they provide information and updates to Captains in every district on the highest level, most concerning threats of retaliation.

2022 STATISTICS: 100 SHOOTER REVIEW COMMITTEE REPORT

Average age of homicide victims	32
Average age of homicide suspects	27
PPD homicide clearance Rate	48.8%
Total number of non-fatal shootings	1781
Average age of non-fatal shooting victims	29
Average age of non-fatal shooting suspects	27
PPD non-fatal shooting clearance rate	24%

(SOURCE: PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEPARTMENT)


100 Shooter Review Committee Report (2022)

Identification of very high risk individuals should not be based on criminal history alone. There is a distinction often lost on the general public as well as sometimes among those who work in this field – the majority of people who are released from jail or prison will never go on to shoot anyone, while the vast majority of people who shoot people have been incarcerated before.

The [100 Shooter Review Committee Report](#) made the keen observation that, “it should be noted that a prior criminal history is not the sole determinant or predictor of future involvement in shootings; however, it is certainly one of the important risk factors.” Criminal history combined with other risk factors can be critical in identifying people who are at very high risk of gun violence.

The following excerpts from the 100 Shooter Review Committee report provide valuable insight into the primary risk factors of those at very high risk of being involved in gun violence:

“Firearm violence in Philadelphia is a racial justice crisis. Shootings disproportionately impact Black communities: in Philadelphia over 80% of shooting victims and 79% of arrestees have been Black since 2015. Both victims and arrestees overwhelmingly come from disadvantaged neighborhoods that are majority non-white, have high rates of poverty and unemployment, and less likely to have a high school degree or diploma. Endemic violence in these communities means that the vast majority of those arrested for gun violence have themselves been previously traumatized, often as a witness to previous violent acts; over 80% have previously accessed or been screened for behavioral health services through the City.”



“An analysis of 100 most recent arrestees (at the time of the September 2020 committee presentation) may not be a representative sample; however, basic background characteristics resembled those of an additional 100 shooter random sample as well as all shooting arrestees in the past 5 years, as subsequent analysis indicated.”

“Offender and victim demographics resemble each other: for the arrested shooters, 94% were male, 95% were people of color (74% Black Male), and the peak age was in late adolescence and young adulthood (18-30 years old). Similarly, for victims, 86.5% were male, 88.5% were people of color (61.5% Black Male), and the peak age was in young adulthood to mid-thirties (21-35 years old).”

“Mirroring characteristics between offenders and victims go beyond demographics. Previous shooting victimizations are fairly common among both victims and offenders.”

“Previous involvement in crimes is also common among both offenders and victims. 50% of the arrestees had a Violent Felony charge in their criminal history, as did 33% of the shooting victims. 38% of the arrestees had a “Violation of Uniform Firearms Act” (VUFA) charge, as did 29% of the shooting victims. 37% of the arrestees had a “Narcotics Possession with Intent to Distribute” (PWID) charge, as did 30% of the shooting victims. **57% of the arrestees had either VUFA or Violent Felony charges in their criminal history, as did 42% of the shooting victims. 68% of the arrestees had either VUFA, PWID or Violent Felony charges, as did 42% of the shooting victims.**”

“As of December 4, 2021, 2,249 people had been arrested for shootings in Philadelphia since 2015: 93% were male, 70% were under the age of 30, 76% had prior arrests, 51% had 3 or more prior arrests, 52% had a prior felony charge, 40% had a prior felony conviction, and 20% had pending court cases at the time of arrest. The most frequent prior charges include drug sales and drug possession, assaults, theft, robbery, and firearm possession without a license.”


“Our analysis identified many touch points between individuals in our cohort prior to the sentinel event (the shooting arrest). Specifically, 93% of our cohort had touch points with either a criminal justice or a Health and Human Services (HHS) agency. On average, the first touch point was 11.5 years prior to the shooting incident.”

“Over 60% of individuals had some sort of outpatient contact with the Department of Behavioral Health and Intellectual Disabilities (DBHIDS), the most common contact found.”

“In 2015, arrestees aged 18-24 comprised less than 3% of the unlicensed possession cases against Black arrestees. But by the first half of 2021, that percentage jumped to 56%.”

“An analysis of homicides in Philadelphia between 1996-1999 found that 25% of people arrested for committing a murder were on probation or parole at the time of the murder, while 29% were awaiting trial or sentencing (Tierney, McClanahan, Hanglely Jr., 2001).”

Aligned with the 100 Shooter Review, a report commissioned by PPD through the federal Public Safety Partnership, the “Non-Fatal Shooting and Gun Violence Reduction Assessment” completed in September 2022 found that “gun violence in Philadelphia is largely driven by narcotics trafficking, intragang arguments, and interpersonal disputes galvanized by social media posts. Most adult offenders and victims are young (18–27) and are known to the criminal justice system.”



The 100 Shooter Review Committee report also includes extremely important cautions about focusing solely on guns:

“...another criminal charge that applies to people who have no felony conviction (carrying a gun in Philadelphia without having obtained a permit in Philadelphia) is only a felony in Philadelphia. The exact same offense in every other county in Pennsylvania (carrying a firearm without a permit to carry) is only a misdemeanor offense. In an equitable system, a permit to carry would be required everywhere in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania or would be required nowhere. But the legislature’s decision to more punitively criminalize and subject to more collateral consequences only the residents of its most diverse city is inequitable and obviously racist.”

“There were more than 12.9 million guns legally sold or transferred in Pennsylvania between 1999 and 2020, an average of over 1,600 per day; 266,186 were sold in Philadelphia (33 per day).”

“...the current intense focus on illegal gun possession without a license is having no effect on the gun violence crisis and distracts from successfully investigating shootings.”

“Focusing so many resources on removing guns from the street while a constant supply of new guns is available is unlikely to stop gun violence, but it does erode trust and the perceived legitimacy of the system. This in turn decreases the likelihood that people will cooperate and participate in the criminal legal system and associated processes, reducing clearance, conviction, and witness appearance rates.”



RECOMMENDATIONS

Suggested Initial 300-500 People to Focus Intensive Interventions

Based on the many programs and processes in Philadelphia that assess risk of violence that NICJR has reviewed, we suggest the following process to begin engaging a “Top 300-500” very high risk individuals in intensive, highly coordinated intervention services, including READI, CCIP, and the Gun Violence Intervention Coordination Center (GVICC).

Start with the top 20-25% of people identified by PPD’s Harm Score, then vet them through four other risk assessment processes, and those identified in at least one or two additional areas will be among the “Top 300-500.”

Statistics of Top 25% of Prolific Gun Violence Offenders (1183 total individuals)

- 75% are African American males under the age of 35
- The average age is 26; juveniles account for only 7%
- Average of 2.7 Part I violent gun crime arrests, and 5.4 Part I crimes per individual
- 42% have been previously arrested for a shooting or shooting at an individual
- 25% have been shot previously
- 19% are vetted gang members

The Risk Harm Score needs to be updated, or run again, then take the top 20-25% and see which of those people:

- Have also been identified in the past six months on a PPD Weekly Intelligence Bulletin
- Or: Have been identified by the PPD social media unit as being involved in social media conflict/taunting/etc in the past 6 months
- Or: have been a victim of gun violence in the past 12 months
- Or: Have been identified by GVI in the past 12 months (among all identified people, regardless of if they are currently being served now or not)

Philadelphia Police Department Staffing

By far the most consistent complaints we heard from PPD personnel during our interviews were that the District Attorney's office is not charging cases they should and that PPD is woefully understaffed. We observed that both of these issues have some basis in reality but are also very misunderstood. The DA provided compelling information about their charging practices and there is also an argument to be made that it is not the number of officers but the current deployment of officers that is the challenge.

Without question, as currently constituted, shooting and homicide investigation units are severely lacking in staff. There is also a need for a few hundred officers to be assigned to a unit or units focused solely on gun violence. While it may be easy to argue that additional officers should be hired to address these needs, better utilization of existing resources could also fill this gap.

In the Philadelphia Crime Analysis Assessment referenced earlier conducted by BJA, the report noted that, "Philadelphia has more than 1.5 million residents and is about 140 square miles in size. PPD has 5,800 officers, which is nearly four officers per 1,000 residents. This ratio is well above the national average number of officers per population (2.4 per 1,000) and above other similarly sized cities (3.1 per 1,000). However, many of these officers are filling civilian-capable positions."

The assessment also found that "28 analysts who are sworn officers work for different districts and units within the Patrol Bureau." The report concluded that PPD should "work to civilianize the CAU to allow sworn personnel to return to the field as patrol officers, investigators, or other specialized units."


NICJR also observed and were informed by several people that a large number of sworn officers are assigned as drivers, another duty that may be able to be effectively filled by civilians. We further suggest that PPD assess its response to calls for service to determine if it can reduce the workload of patrol officers by utilizing alternative responses to low-level, non-criminal calls, which are often a high volume of the calls officers respond to in a city.

Gun Violence Reduction Strategy


A comprehensive, effective Gun Violence Reduction Strategy (GVRS) in Philadelphia should begin with a data and intelligence driven identification of the people and groups most likely to engage in gun violence. Such an initiative can be brought together using Philadelphia's current programs, processes, and assets. The City should begin with modifying and improving PPD Shooting Reviews. These meetings should be expanded to include a robust discussion about every shooting incident in the past seven days that information and intelligence show have a likelihood of retaliation. Given the volume of such incidents in Philadelphia, the meeting needs to be modified. NICJR has proposed a few options of how to do this in the appendix.

With an expanded and improved weekly Shooting Review, then approximately 10-20 people should be identified each week as being at very high risk of being involved in gun violence and prioritized for intensive intervention.


A discussion should occur in the Shooting Review about whether each person will be the subject of imminent law enforcement engagement or referred to intensive services. If the individual is a suspect in a recent crime and is likely to be arrested for that crime, then they should be prioritized for enforcement action. If enforcement action is not planned, they should be referred to intensive services. Usually, this means 25% will receive enforcement action and 75% will be referred to services. (In some instances, an individual may be referred to services but still may be under surveillance or have their social media monitored by law enforcement due to their criminal history combined with their heightened risk level based on a recent incident).



DRAFT PHILADELPHIA GVRS MODEL



PHILADELPHIA INTERVENTION SERVICES COORDINATION



Engagement: Direct and Respectful Communication

Once high-risk individuals and groups are identified, the GVRS strategy requires immediate engagement. This engagement involves direct and respectful communication to inform identified individuals of their risk and offering them services. There are two primary formats for these discussions: Group meetings, referred to as “Call-Ins” and individual meetings, sometimes referred to as “Customized Notifications.” At Call-Ins, the identified very high risk individuals are invited to attend a meeting with community leaders, law enforcement officials, formerly incarcerated individuals, survivors of violence, and service providers. All of these different stakeholders deliver the same message in their own way: based on your risk factors, you are at very high risk of being shot or being arrested for a shooting; the violence needs to end and we will do all we can to achieve that; we care about you; we want to provide you with real and intensive services. Treating the participants with dignity at a safe, neutral location is essential to a successful Call-In. Custom Notifications convey similar messages about the risk of violence and the availability of services. However, Custom Notifications are individual meetings where a high-ranking police officer and a community leader directly make contact with an individual at their home or community. Custom Notifications are frequently employed when the risk of violence is imminent or when individuals are unable to attend group meetings.

Provision of Services

Subsequent to a Call-In or a Custom Notification, individuals identified as being at very high risk of gun violence are directly connected to available services, supports, and opportunities. The first and primary service is a positive and trusting relationship with a Life Coach or Violence Intervention worker, someone with similar lived experiences as the people they are serving. These individuals are often known as Credible Messengers. The Life Coach or Intervention Worker develops an intensive and personal relationship – which is the most important aspect of the “services”. Unlike service brokering based case management, contact between the Life Coach and the client must be frequent, flexible, consistent, and on-going for a long period of time. Life Coaches should have daily communication with every client on their caseload; see each client in person 3-4 times per week; work with clients for at least six months but preferably 18 months; and develop a positive and trusting relationship. Once an initial rapport is established, Life Coaches then

work with each client to develop a Life Plan. Life Plans include short and long-term target goals, desired outcomes, specific referrals to services/supports for the client.

With the current volume of shootings in Philadelphia, NICJR estimates that there are approximately 1,200 people that are identifiable as at Very High Risk of being involved in gun violence each year. With 1,200 VHR people, the suggested staffing to effectively implement a citywide GVRS includes:

- 150 Intensive Life Coaches/Case Managers/Credible Messengers (150/8)
- 50 Outreach Workers (1 for every 3 Life Coaches)
- 35 Violence Interrupters

Primary Roles & Responsibilities of GVRS Staff:

Outreach Worker (OW):

- Locate, Engage, and Hand-off to Life Coaches Very High Risk individuals
- Attend and host key community events for the purpose of developing relationships in neighborhoods with high rates of violence

Life Coach (LC):

- Develop positive and trusting relationships with Very High Risk individuals
- Develop and implement Life Plans with each person on the caseload

Violence Interrupter (VI):

- Respond to shooting scenes
- Develop relationships with key people and groups engaged in conflicts
- Mediate Conflicts
- Gather and share with the team critical information on most active/violent conflicts

Philadelphia will have to increase its current number of Life Coaches and hire new Violence Interrupters in order to achieve these staffing numbers. The City is in the process of bringing on Cure Violence to conduct Street Outreach but would have to incorporate that program into GVRS to be most effective.

Focused, Proactive Gun Violence Reduction Policing

GVRs includes focused enforcement. Philadelphia should re-constitute a unit of officers focused solely on gun violence reduction. A good team should be built with a case agent, a cold case agent and other officers for support. Gun violence reduction units would identify the most active (violent) groups, collect information and establish intelligence, utilize firearm ballistics evidence (NIBN), conduct ongoing investigations, and engage in intelligence-led enforcement actions. Ideally, all operations at this level are planned, coordinated, and well supervised with little to no time for discretionary activity

Unit Activities include:

1. Social media monitoring of very high risk (VHR) groups and individuals
2. Greater attention and deeper investigations into older or active cases of VHR individuals (giving those cases more priority and attention than others)
3. Developing intelligence into VHR groups and individuals (Confidential Informants, etc)
4. Prioritizing ballistics testing/matching on gang guns
5. Surveillance of VHR individuals

These teams should lead with ethical policing and use procedural justice. These teams should receive additional training in Constitutional Policing, Procedural Justice, and Community Engagement.

In the city the size of Philadelphia, with 5,000 sworn police officers, there should be at least 400 officers transferred primarily from patrol into such a Gun Violence Reduction Unit, preferably under a central command and not distributed throughout the districts.

Ideally, PPD would also partner with probation and parole to have a team of POs who carry special case loads of those individuals identified through GVRs as very high risk of being involved in gun violence.

GVRS Management Cycle

To effectively implement and sustain a successful Gun Violence Reduction Strategy, Philadelphia will need to create or improve the following meetings into a regular GVRS Management Cycle:

- **Weekly Leadership Meeting:** Key leaders of the strategy meet to review progress, address any challenges, and confirm priorities and deliverables for the week (small meeting of no more than 3-4 people). This should include the OVP Director, PPD Deputy Chief, and the assigned Director of the Strategy.
- **Weekly Shooting Review:** Philadelphia has these meetings now but as discussed they need expanded and improved.
- **Weekly Coordination Meeting:** Information from the Shooting Review is provided to intervention organizations and assignments made for outreach and/or Direct Communication. This meeting should preferably be held immediately following Shooting Review. Philadelphia started these meetings and for a time they were going well, but the meetings now need to be redesigned and ensure information from the Shooting Review is being shared in them and assignments to Outreach Workers are being made.
- **Weekly or Bi-weekly Case Conference with Life Coaches:** Briefly review every case assigned to each Life Coach and review one challenging case per Life Coach to have group problem solving.
- **Weekly Team Meetings:** Each team of staff meeting individually with their supervisor to check in (if this is happening regularly then the Case Conference can be bi-weekly).
- **Bi-Weekly TA Meetings:** Leadership Team meet with the Technical Assistance providers.

- **Monthly or Bi-Monthly Mayor’s Performance Management Meeting:** With Mayor, GVRS Director, OVP Director, Police Chief, other police leadership, primary service provider Directors, possibly Supervision agency leadership. Review GVRS Goals and Metrics, agree to any needed improvements and deliverables and receive brief updates from each agency.
- **Bi-Monthly or Quarterly Partnership or Advisory Committee:** Key community stakeholders and government agency partners meet to receive updates on GVRS and provide input and ask questions.

CompStat Recommendations

- Renew commitments to core organizational crime reduction goals and strategies, the success of which require an organizational unity of effort. Plan, direct, and communicate the importance of individual command, division, unit, and squad responsibilities for success.
- Involve CAU in creating, disseminating, and updating CompStat data, dashboards, and reports to evaluate dept. goals at the citywide, ROC, and district levels.
- Reevaluate the number and size of pinpoint grids
- Require regional command and district crime reduction plans to align with department goals and priorities.
- Adapt and flex plans given an emergence of a trend, possibility of retaliation, or upon receipt of intelligence-led enforcement priorities.
- Commit to holding daily crime briefs, biweekly CompStat meetings, and weekly shooting reviews with cancellations reserved for exceptional occurrences.

PNI Recommendations

- Enhancing the availability and accessibility of information concerning PNI's implementation and outcomes would be a productive step towards assessing and enhancing the program's effectiveness, replicating successful strategies, and sharing efforts transparently with stakeholders and community members. This data may very well exist, but it was neither shared with NICJR nor is it currently available to the public.
- The police performance data available for PNI is limited to the number and location of arrests made for prioritized offenses. However, this data alone does not offer a complete assessment of law enforcement efforts, as it overlooks information on the total number of stops and searches, their outcomes, and the initiating reasons for all contacts. Moreover, no data was presented on the potential risks involved in these measures, such as pursuits, uses of force, injuries, and complaints. Evaluating these broader sets of data would allow for a more comprehensive understanding of the precise and targeted nature of the law enforcement measures employed in the PNI program.
- To enhance the effectiveness of the PNI strategy, increased collaboration with the Office of the District Attorney's Charging, Diversion, and Municipal Court Units may be needed, or data on Accelerated Misdemeanor Program referrals and outcomes should be provided and discussed in PNI Board Meetings. Doing so would better reflect the current level of satisfactory collaboration. According to PPD, referring non-violent misdemeanor arrestees to the program and assessing its success has been challenging, and addressing these issues could benefit the PNI strategy.

Detailed recommendations for improving Shooting Reviews can be found in Appendix A.

Detailed recommendations for the SIG can be found in Appendix B.

APPENDICES



APPENDIX A: Details on Expanding and Improving Shooting Reviews

Basic Components of a Shooting Review:

A shooting review is a three-part weekly meeting of knowledgeable front-line officers as a working group to analyze and manage recent violence.

1. Incident reviews: crisply paced but thorough reviews of shootings that focus on the people involved; the circumstances and motives; street networks; conflicts among networks and the likelihood of retaliation.
2. Strategy discussion: brainstorming and problem-solving to produce plans for employing intelligence, communication, intervention and enforcement – quickly – to address violence.
3. Management: the use of report-outs and performance metrics to ensure timely follow-through on the incident reviews and strategy discussion.

This can be surprisingly difficult:

1. Using data to drive decision-making can require a culture change.
2. Not everybody is open to intelligence-based, targeted enforcement, informed by the principles of procedural justice. And it's hard.
3. The priority in this type of shooting review is “managing” violence – not managing investigations – also a kind of culture change.
4. Directly communicating and/or supporting community intervention with those at highest risk of violence, and incorporating the principles of procedural justice into these efforts requires PPD acceptance and support as an effective best practice.
5. Shooting reviews focus on the role of relationships/social networks as key to the potential for retaliation and conflicts not on gang membership per se. So, again, this could require a change in standard operating procedures.

The risk of future gun-shot victimization is highly influenced by the composition of an individual's social network. The more people someone is connected to who are victims or perpetrators of shootings, the higher their risk. Currently, during the PPD shooting review not enough emphasis is being placed on driving factors of the shooting, possible retaliation, services referrals or connectivity with NIBIN databases to link shootings even when victims are being shot multiple times. Time and time again this has proven to be instrumental in changing the trajectories of victims and suspects lives and outcomes. The average time to a retaliation shooting once someone is “infected” is about 125 days.

If implemented correctly the PPD shooting reviews can foster new enforcement options:

1. Short, focused enforcement cycles can help limit retaliation, take the heat out of active conflicts, and buy time for communication and intervention efforts to work.
2. Near-term enforcement, using a range of charges, is designed to get priority individuals off the street, including likely shooters, influential or so-called “impact players”; prevent retaliation and to cool down ongoing conflicts.
3. Eventually, shooting reviews lead to “enforcement plans” for priority groups and conflicts (per shooting scorecards), with very specific goals and activities for each group and individual.
4. Shooting reviews align the focus of law enforcement partners with PPD priority groups & individuals via:
 - a. Inviting participation in shooting reviews and enforcement partner meetings
 - b. Designating clear roles for partners within enforcement plans
 - c. Capturing agreements and commitments in written protocols or MOAs, etc.

Finalizing Shooting Review Agenda:

Any successful shooting review starts with clear objectives, actionable plans, deliverables, and accountability. To that end having a codified agenda is essential not only to the success of the strategy but more importantly to the long-term reduction sustainability. A sample agenda can be found on the following page.





Sample Shooting Review Agenda

1. Review/Get Updates on Assignments from Previous Week

2. Review Past 7 Days' Shootings

- Review every incident where a shooting occurred
- Review every homicide of any type
- Incident Review Questions
 - What happened?
 - Why did it happen?
 - Who was involved?
 - Any group/crew/gang involvement on either side?
 - Is retaliation likely?
 - Who (group and individual) is likely to retaliate?
 - Who (group and individual) is likely to be retaliated against?
 - Supervision status of ID'ed individuals?

3. Assign unit to deconflict with individuals ID'ed in above

- Anyone who going to be arrested soon removed from list to be given to intervention services

4. Assign points to the Group Scorecard

5. Finalize Intervention referral list

- For Call In, Custom Notification, or Direct Outreach

6. Develop enforcement plan (should happen outside of the meeting)

Additional Details:

Participants:

- Police department, 15-25 of the most knowledgeable police personnel who have information about shooting dynamics, street conflicts, gangs/groups. This may include investigators, special units, and certainly should include intel.
- Probation and Parole to inform the group if people being discussed are under supervision but should also include probation and parole personnel who are knowledgeable of gang/group dynamics, etc.
- Sheriff or Corrections staff to provide intelligence from the local jail (gang groupings/conflicts, visitation info, etc).
- All federal partners: FBI, ATF, US Marshalls, etc.

Data/Information provided:

- YTD data on non-fatal, injury shootings and homicides including comparison vs each additional previous 3 years.
- As much info on every shooting that has occurred in the past 7 days:
 - Time, location, summary of incident, type of caliber used, number of shots fired.
 - Victim and Suspect: Name, DOB, picture, group affiliation, supervision status, criminal justice history.
- Updated Scorecard

Discussion:

- Review assignments from previous meeting.
- A designated staff provides overview of each incident, may be the investigator of each assigned case.
- A leader of the Department: Assistant/Deputy Chief or maybe Commander of Violence Reduction Unit facilitates discussion and even calls on people to discuss any pertinent information related to incident or about the people or groups involved in the incident: What do we know: conflicts, siblings, girlfriends, social media chatter, etc.
- All of the discussion is for the purpose of identifying individuals who may retaliate or get retaliated against.
- Review assignments given.

Options on how to cover all shooting incidents in Shooting Review:

With such a large volume of shootings that occur each week in Philadelphia, the current one hour weekly Shooting Review meeting is not able to effectively discuss every shooting incident that has occurred in the previous seven days. Below are suggested options on how to remedy this challenge:

1. Have two or three citywide Shooting Reviews per week, so you are reviewing all shootings that occurred in the past two to three days. The upside is you keep it citywide which is preferable to see all connections and have everyone involved, the downside is less time in between incidents and the meeting to gather more intel. Another downside is just more meetings.
2. Split the city into no more than three areas and have one Shooting Review per week in each area. The downside is missing the connections between areas. One way to mitigate that is have a small team who are in each of the meetings.
3. Baltimore was faced with this same dilemma and has decided to have a weekly shooting review per police district with a high volume of shootings.
4. In Indianapolis, the police department decided to go with a citywide, weekly Shooting Review. Prior to the meeting, a small team of analysts and investigators vet all shootings and determine which ones have the highest likelihood of retaliation and select those incidents as the ones to present and discuss each week. They also agree that if that includes numerous incidents that week, the meeting will take as long as it needs to achieve the goal.

The PPD daily 8am call that very briefly discussed major incidents from the day before could be a venue to identify shootings to be discussed at the Shooting Review. The 8am call should also identify emerging priorities that require delegated action prior to the next Shooting Review.

APPENDIX B: Detailed Recommendations to Improve the Shooting Investigation Group (SIG)

The recurring management cycle utilized by the SIG should be as follows:

- Identify an Issue
- Conduct Background Research
- Develop and Deploy an Enforcement Plan
- Follow through with Charging and Courtroom Testimony
- Assess Efficiency and Effectiveness
- Communicate Results

Due to the ongoing nature of this cycle, it is common for portions to overlap within an investigation and with additional investigations. Each of the investigative components contains subcomponents. The below is not an exhaustive list, but a summary intended to show the process:

- **Identify an Issue**
 - Issues identified by many sources
 - Patrol and Street Teams
 - Investigators
 - Shooting Review Scorecard
 - Citizens
- **Develop and Deploy an Enforcement Plan**
 - Establish Goals
 - Identify Resources and Collaborators
 - Construct Enforcement Strategy
 - Begin Enforcement, continuously assess
 - Start Takedown Planning Early and continuously update
- **Conduct Background Research**
 - Intel can be developed by many of the same sources
 - Patrol and Street Teams
 - Investigators
 - Citizens
 - Intel Officers
 - Outside Agencies
 - Intel is also developed through additional sources
 - Informants
 - Surveillance
 - Focused enforcement
 - Interviews
 - Database Research
 - Search Warrants
- **Follow through with Charging and Courtroom Testimony**
 - DA's Office looped in before Goals established
 - Follow Up for DA's Office Requests
 - Expert Testimony
- **Assess Efficiency and Effectiveness**
 - Honest Assessment of Strategy, Tactics, Attainment of Goals
 - Use of Resources
 - Effect on Trends
- **Communicate Results**
 - Share Intelligence
 - Share Experience
 - Disseminate intel at appropriate intervals summarize upon conclusion

Organization

Through training and experience, the SIG members will recognize the benefit of developing specialized skillsets in order to facilitate the above operations. These skillsets (plainclothes surveillance, arrest teams, etc.) already exist in various forms throughout the PPD, though not standardized in training, vocabulary, or expectation. The SIG should implement a Training and Development Plan that progresses Officers through a series of roles with the intent of incrementally cultivating and building on skills necessary for success in their next role.

It is recommended that the SIG organize officers into the following roles:

- Case Agent (Lead Investigator)
- Plainclothes Surveillance Unit
- Arrest Team

Each Role encompasses the skills of the previous functions and comes with the expectation of being able to backfill preceding functions (i.e. a person with Case Agent experience may be needed to act as plainclothes surveillance).

Additionally, SIG can implement formal expectations within each of these roles with intent to develop each officer to an advanced level within their role, having the ability, and responsibility, to train their successors. The following is again not an exhaustive list, but a summary of responsibilities of each of the roles:

- *Arrest Team Officers*
 - Remains in response range to Plainclothes Officers for emergency or other intervention.
 - Conducts IDs, wall stops, and investigative contacts in order to develop information while the investigation remains undetected.
 - Conducts enforcement, arrests, and transports
 - Takes surveillance notes and transfers notes to police report.
 - Assists with research, reports, search warrants, interviews, and informant use/development.

- *Plainclothes Surveillance Officers*
 - Remains in close proximity to Target Subject(s) while remaining undetected, for an indeterminate amount of time, in order to make critical observations
 - Relays crucial information that drives the investigation
 - Maintains ability to switch to uniformed enforcement should the need arise
 - Takes surveillance notes and transfers notes to police report
 - Assists with research, reports, search warrants, interviews, and informant use/development
- *Secondary Case Agent*
 - Assists Case Agent in all duties
 - Takes over as Case Agent in absence of Primary
- *Primary Case Agent*
 - Drives Enforcement Strategy
 - Liaison between street teams, investigator, and DA's Office
 - Receives, Organizes, and Records all information pertinent to the Investigation. Disseminates appropriate information back to Field Units

Additionally, all team members should have set proficiency expectations, including:

- Ability to make tactically sound decisions in demanding situations; maturity to stay on task over extended periods
- Capacity to conduct IDs, Wall Stops, and investigative contacts without revealing larger investigation
- Possesses a reliable understanding of the Law and PPD Policy, especially in regard to Search and Seizure, Use of Force
- Writes thorough reports and gives accurate testimony on all assigned tasks
- Has a basic understanding of multiple types of search warrants; can obtain basic search warrants upon acquiring probable cause
- Can assist in conducting interviews and conducts basic informant development /usage
- Has an understanding of Criminal Street Gangs and neighborhoods

Training

In developing a training plan, SIG should recognize fundamental skill sets necessary for the positive contribution of officers toward the overall achievement of the Section's goals. Officers moving through the above organization progression will need to achieve basic, intermediate, and advanced levels of proficiency in core concepts in order to effectively contribute to current roles and advance to roles requiring additional levels of responsibility. The following is an outline of skills for each of the organizational roles:

- *Arrest Team*
 - Understand of the components of a Gang Investigation
 - Learn the Role of an Arrest Team within an investigation
 - Learn to Manage Informants
 - Author, Serve, and follow up for several types of search warrants
 - Attend PPD search warrant/Informant Training
 - Attend External SW Training
 - Attend External Informant Training
 - Obtain Wiretap Certification if applicable
 - Work as Wiretap call monitor if applicable
 - Assist in and conduct Interviews
 - Proficiently conduct investigative, ID, and Wall stops
 - Articulate contact vs detention
 - Proficiently conduct Enforcement/Directed Arrests
 - Effectively conduct Foot pursuits
 - Effectively conduct Vehicle pursuits
 - Balance Response/Detection as Arrest Team in covert surveillance
 - Understand Information vs Intelligence
 - Effectively utilize LE Databases
 - Maintain and upload actionable surveillance notes
 - Communicate with Lead Investigators from various Departments, Divisions and Sections

- *Plainclothes Surveillance*
 - Write an Operations Plan and Conduct Briefing
 - Attend Interview/Interrogation Training
 - Executing GPS warrants, track results
 - Attach Vehicle Tracker
 - Initiate and maintain Gang Research
 - Initiate Criminal Investigation
 - Monitor and document Social media
 - Thoroughly debrief subjects for intel and document
 - Maintain informants
 - Collaborate with investigators regularly
 - Introduction to Plainclothes surveillance
 - Attend External Plainclothes surveillance training
 - Present cases for charging
 - Progress Knowledge of Previous Level to Intermediate/Advanced
 - Attend External Gang Investigation training
- *Secondary Case Agent*
 - Intermediate Plainclothes surveillance
 - Attend Intermediate/Advanced Gang Investigation training
 - Assist in maintaining/managing ongoing gang investigation
 - Liaison with Uniform Teams, investigators, other units, etc. to develop and maintain Gang investigations and Intel
 - Routinely assist in Charging presentations
 - Lead interviews
- *Primary Case Agent*
 - Lead Investigations
 - Routinely Lead charging presentations
 - Testify as Gang Expert
 - Prepare Gang Predicate Reports if applicable
 - Assist in teaching internal Plainclothes Surveillance training

In order to facilitate the development of SIG Officers, the Section utilizes three primary means of training:

- Mentorship by senior officers
- Formal In-Section Training
- Outside Training

Mentorship is first accomplished through assigning senior Officers to newly assigned Officers in order to acclimate to the section and the Arrest Team role. With each advance in role, a new senior Officer is assigned to assist in their training.

Formal In-Section Training is accomplished through bi-monthly training put on by members of the section, focused on the development of specific skills (e.g., surveillance, search warrant service, observational exercises, and Gang Expert development).

Outside training is accomplished through the identification and attendance of vital courses that benefit the development of Officers in these roles. While new courses will be identified, the SIG should recognize the need for regular attendance of all members in key courses in order to facilitate consistent expectations.

With the right leadership, an agreed upon plan, and a better understanding of the issues at hand driving gun violence the PPD can operate more efficiently, and the SIG can be the foundation and the core of this agency's attempts to deter, decrease, and prevent gun violence. Before this can even be imagined or operationalized this agency has to come to terms that there is a significant amount of group/gang dynamic driving violence and decide that the agency is going to collaborate with external/internal partners, the community, the city, and services to address this. Without a doubt we can say that this problem with gun violence is too large for solely the police to handle, solely the city to handle, or solely for the community to handle, but together extraordinary goals can be accomplished in communities that need them the most but trust them the least.

Philadelphia

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ASSESSMENT OF
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REDUCTION INITIATIVES**

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