# JUST 8 SAFE

HOW TO REFORM POLICE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS WHILE INCREASING PUBLIC SAFETY



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### **Executive Summary**

Police departments in the United States are charged with a broad set of responsibilities, and officers typically have little specialized training in the breadth of complex issues they encounter. Police are asked to respond to robberies and homicides, but they also enforce traffic rules and respond to noise complaints, domestic disputes, mental health crises, unhoused individuals, and more. Simply put, police are asked to do too much with too little.

The National Institute for Criminal Justice Reform (NICJR) has conducted multiple studies analyzing the type and severity of calls for service (CFS; i.e., 911 calls) in a variety of police departments across the country, finding across the board that CFS are overwhelmingly for noncriminal or low-level incidents. For example, according to NICJR's analysis of Oakland Police Department (OPD) calls for service data, between 2018-2020, nearly 60% of calls responded to by OPD were for noncriminal matters. This amounted to more than 368,000 responses. And in Seattle, NICJR found that 79% of calls received were noncriminal or low-level events, and only 6% of calls were associated with felonies of any kind, violent or nonviolent.<sup>1</sup>

For this report, NICJR analyzed CFS data as well as police department (PD) budgets for 10 California cities and eight cities in other US states. Across all 18 cities:

Figure 1: Time and Budget Allocated to Low-Level Response



Average % of city general fund budgets that go to police departments

30.3%



Average % of PD budgets from general fund that goes to patrol division

36.3%



Estimated % of patrol time spent on CFS<sup>2</sup>

90%



Average % of CFS that are noncriminal or low level

**75%** 

Police departments serve many functions beyond responding to calls for service. However, patrol divisions make up the largest portion of police departments, accounting for nearly half of the staff and even a larger portion of the budget in many agencies. Because calls for service are overwhelmingly for noncriminal or lowlevel incidents, almost all of the work of a patrol division consists of responding to calls that do not relate to serious crime or violence. This is true both in large, urban areas and in smaller, more suburban or rural communities.

<sup>1</sup> Seattle Calls for Service Analysis

<sup>2</sup> The presence of specialized units—such as crime reduction, problem-solving, or community resource-oriented officers—within some patrol divisions can create the appearance of a lower percentage of time spent on CFS for those divisions. However, in many police departments, the patrol division consists solely of patrol officers, whose workload is predominantly, if not entirely, dedicated to responding to CFS.

In an op-ed for the largest newspaper in Chicago, a 31-year veteran of the Chicago Police Department, David Franco, wrote that police officers "spend entire shifts dealing with noncriminal matters from disturbance and suspicious person calls to noise complaints and fender-benders. Most of the criminal matters are low-level issues: trespassing, property damage, cell phones stolen from cars.... With so many low-level issues put on our shoulders, police cannot prioritize the serious crimes that our city desperately needs to address."3

Meanwhile, the number of people in a given jurisdiction who are responsible for most gun violence is very small – usually less than 1% of the jurisdiction's population. NICJR and its partner, the California Partnership for Safe Communities, have conducted a series of Gun Violence Problem Analyses in several cities, including Indianapolis, IN; Green Bay, WI; Austin, TX; and Washington, DC. A very similar outcome has been found in each city: Gun violence is tightly concentrated among a very small number of young adults who are at very high risk. These individuals are identifiable, and the violence is predictable and therefore the shootings are preventable, with effective intervention.

Yet most police departments dedicate very few resources to the kind of focused enforcement and intelligence gathering necessary to significantly reduce gun violence. The significant burden of responding to noncriminal and nonviolent CFS constrains the capacity of many police departments to engage in the necessary work of solving crimes, reducing gun violence, and responding to immediate and serious threats to public safety.

For this report, NICJR also analyzed data from nine correctional agencies in five jurisdictions across the country to assess their workload, focus on serious crime, and budgets. There is a similar mismatch in the broader criminal justice system, where significant resources are expended providing lengthy correctional supervision terms to both high-risk and low-risk individuals that do not effectively meet the needs of either population. Although only a small percentage of those on probation or parole supervision are at high risk for violence or re-offense, in many jurisdictions one in five people has a supervision term of more than five years. In Maryland, for example, only 8.2% of individuals under supervision are assessed as being at high or very high risk of re-offense.4 Even among those, most assessment tools do not differentiate between high risk for violent offenses and all other types of re-offense.

Overall, too many law enforcement and criminal justice system resources are focused on incidents and individuals that can be safely and effectively addressed by alternative means, allowing policing and correctional resources to be used to reduce and prevent serious crime and violence.

The last section of this report includes recommendations on how to implement a Just and Safe jurisdiction, which includes:

- Implementing effective community-based alternative response. programs
- Significantly reducing police response to low-level and noncriminal calls for service
- Re-assign officers from patrol to increase staffing of proactive units focused on reducing and investigating nonfatal shootings and homicides
- Develop police departments into Highly Accountable Learning Organizations (HALO)
- Reduce Improve Reinvest: Reducing the size of criminal justice agencies; vastly improving their operations and the outcomes of system-impacted youth and adults; and reinvesting savings from a reduced system back into the communities most impacted by crime, violence, and incarceration

<sup>3</sup> Trained civilians, not sworn police officers, could better respond to hundreds of 911 calls

<sup>4</sup> Maryland Division of Parole and Probation Data Dashboard

### **Policing Analyses**

To identify calls for service that could be safely diverted to non-law enforcement agencies, NICJR analyzed the types of incidents to which patrol officers respond based on calls for service from community members. This analysis was supplemented by a review of budget data from these same cities to estimate the cost of police responses to these calls for service, as well as an analysis of homicide clearance rates and department staffing. Individual city analyses can be found appended to this report.

#### Methodology

NICJR collected CFS data from 10 California cities, intentionally selecting departments that represent all regions of the state with populations ranging from small to large. Those cities were Berkeley, Chico, Fresno, Long Beach, Los Angeles, Marina, Oakland, Sacramento, San Diego, and Stockton. For each city, NICJR analyzed the three most recent complete years of calls for service data available at the time of inquiry.



NICJR also collected CFS data from eight cities outside of California, with a focus on representing every major region in the US and including a variety of sizes, demographics, and crime levels. Those cities were Atlanta, GA; Cincinnati, OH; Las Vegas, NV; Lincoln, NE; New Orleans, LA; Phoenix, AZ; Providence, RI; and Seattle, WA. As with California cities, NICJR collected the three most recent, complete years of data available at the time of inquiry.

NICJR cleaned each city's data by removing duplicate calls and calls with insufficient description information. NICJR then removed calls that did not have an officer dispatched to them.<sup>5</sup> Removing calls that were not dispatched changed the distributions by less than 1% in almost every category in every city.

<sup>5</sup> Some cities did not have variables that indicated whether a call had officers dispatched to it, as noted in individual city profiles.

The remaining unique cases were coded into six categories, five of which correspond to the alleged behavior that resulted in the CFS and one of which describes non-CFS incidents in the data. These non-CFS incidents reflect administrative processes, such as communication between the dispatch unit and the patrol officers, and officer-initiated stops that were not in response to a call for service.6

The remaining four categories are: noncriminal incidents, misdemeanors, nonviolent felonies, and serious violent felonies. Noncriminal incidents include issues such as traffic collisions, missing people, and noise disturbances. Misdemeanors include low-level crimes such as certain types of drug possession or vandalism. Nonviolent felonies include incidents such as more serious drug issues and various thefts, while serious violent felonies include activities such as felony assault, robbery, and murder.

Using approved Fiscal Year 2021 budgets, NICJR also analyzed the proportion of each city's general fund that was allocated to the police department. Although cities and police departments both have funding sources in addition to the general funds, NICJR focused on general funds, as they are the primary source of government funds and derived from taxpayer dollars. NICJR also used the approved budgets to identify the number of authorized police officers.

Finally, NICJR analyzed the percentage of homicides solved (i.e., clearance rates) for each city. These data, which were collected from local jurisdiction reports such as police department data portals, annual reports, or local news sources, are intended to be an indicator of each department's efficacy in one of its most important functions: its ability to solve crimes.

#### **Data Limitations**

There are several data limitations that impact the specificity of NICJR's calls for service analysis.

First, each city has its own codes and descriptions for various crimes. The level of specificity in codes and descriptions varies from city to city. For example, Los Angeles has highly specific call codes that indicate whether a disturbance call is for a party or for a disturbance involving weapons. Other cities may only indicate a disturbance without further specificity.

Second, officer-initiated, or "on-view" stops make up a large number of certain datasets, but they may not contain information on the nature of the incident that led to the stop. This means that the data cannot be coded or categorized into an incident type for this analysis.

Third, not all cities had dispatch statuses for their calls. When this occurred, a proxy was used if possible, such as on-scene arrival time. There are times when certain calls for service are not responded to, and those are not included in the analysis. Some cities had no reliable data for dispatch, which means that some cities are not a direct comparison.

Finally, although all calls were coded based on the type of incident alleged in the call, it is possible that the actual incident was more or less serious than noted in the call. There are no data with which to track this. In addition, many calls are for "wobblers," or offenses that can be charged as misdemeanors or felonies based on a variety of circumstances. Further, some offenses, such as assaults, have both misdemeanor and felony versions. Some cities specified in the call descriptions the severity of the call. In entries where there was no specification, wobbler offenses were coded as misdemeanors.

<sup>6</sup> Administrative calls also include incomplete 911 calls or hang ups that do not have a call type associated with them. There are several other call types that might require officer dispatch but are otherwise too vague to sort, such as "be on the lookout" calls, serving warrants for unspecified crimes, and instances where an officer fired a gun.



Across each of the 10 California cities analyzed, NICJR found that:

Most police calls for service are for noncriminal matters

75.7%

of police calls across 10 CA cities were not related to crime.

On average

of city general funds go to police.

California has fewer police officers per resident than the national average (1.6:1,000) vs. (3.57:1,000)

#### The majority of calls for service were for noncriminal matters.

The percentage of CFS that were noncriminal ranged from 56% in Los Angeles to 89% in Marina, with an average of 75.7% across all 10 cities. A majority of the cities fell in the 70-80% range.

This is consistent with NICJR's previous focused research in Oakland and Seattle, as well as other studies, such as the Vera Institute's 911 Analysis study, that have also found that a majority of CFS are for situations that do not involve violent crime.


#### Misdemeanor calls were significantly more common than calls for nonviolent and serious violent felonies.

The percentage of calls that were for misdemeanors ranged from 7.3% in Marina to 30% in Los Angeles. The median for misdemeanor calls across all 10 cities was 17.4%.

#### Calls for nonviolent and serious felonies made up the smallest portion of the data set.

Combined, these calls comprised less than 10% of the data set in all cities except Los Angeles. The average percentage of nonviolent felony CFS across all cities was 2.5%, with a low of 0.7% and a high of 4.5%. Calls for serious violent felonies ranged from 1.4% to 13%; however, these calls made up less than 4% of the data set in seven cities, and the average across all cities was 4.4%.

<sup>7 911</sup> Analysis: Call Data Shows We Can Rely Less on Police




#### NICJR also found that, overall, cities allocated a substantial share of their general fund budgets to police departments.

On average, the police departments of the 10 cities analyzed received 38.9% of their cities' general funds. Stockton received the largest proportion at 54.9%, followed by Fresno, which dedicated 51.6%.

#### Within those allocations, patrol units received a substantial share of the funds.

Although patrol budget information was not available for all 10 cities, among those available, an average of 47.3% of the general funds budgeted for police departments were dedicated to patrol.

<sup>8</sup> San Diego and Stockton data do not indicate whether or not a call was dispatched.



#### Across the 10 California cities, the average ratio of officers to residents was lower than the national average.

The average ratio of police officers to residents across the 10 cities was 1.6:1,000, while the national average was 3.57:1,000.9 The city with the lowest police-to-resident ratio was Chico, at 1:1,000, and the highest by a significant margin was Los Angeles, at 2.5:1,000; the next highest was Oakland, at 1.8:1,000.

#### Both the number of homicides and the homicide clearance rate varied significantly across the 10 cities.

Berkeley, Chico, and Marina all had very few or no homicides in recent years. Los Angeles and Oakland, however, experienced the highest number of homicides in 2023, with respective counts of 327 and 119 homicides annually. That same year, San Diego had the highest homicide clearance rate at 84.4%, followed by Los Angeles at 76%. Chico had the lowest clearance rate of 33.3% despite having just three homicides that year. Sacramento had the second-lowest clearance rate at 46%, followed by Oakland, a city with a high rate of homicides, at 48.7%. Overall, the CA cities with clearance rates in this sample had an average of 73% which is much higher than the 2023 national average of 56%.

<sup>9</sup> Law Enforcement Employees Reported by the United States 10 FBI Crime Data Explorer



Across the eight cities outside of California, NICJR found that:

73%

of police calls for service in 8 cities were for noncriminal matters.

On average

of city general funds go to police.

The average officer per resident ratio was

#### The majority of calls for service were for noncriminal matters.


The percentage of CFS that were noncriminal ranged from 68.9% in Atlanta to 87.4% in Providence. The average across all eight cities was 73%, which is similar to the California cities analyzed.

#### Misdemeanor calls varied significantly but were always more common than calls for nonviolent and serious violent felonies combined.

The percentage of calls that were for misdemeanors ranged from 10.5% in Providence to 32.6% in Las Vegas. The median for average calls across all eight cities was 21.2%. The combined percentage of calls for nonviolent and serious violent felonies ranged from 2.2% in Providence to 9.6% in New Orleans. The average combined percentage was 5.8%.


#### Calls for nonviolent and serious felonies made up the smallest portion of the data set.

Combined, these comprised less than 10% of calls in all eight cities. The smallest percentage of both categories of calls was in Providence, at 1% and 1.2% for nonviolent and serious violent felonies, respectively. The largest was 2.3% and 7.3% in Phoenix. The average percentage of serious violent felonies across all eight cities was 3.8%.



#### NICJR also found that, overall, cities allocated a substantial share of their general fund budgets to police departments.

On average, the police departments of the eight cities analyzed received 30.3% of their cities' general funds. The Phoenix Police Department received the largest portion at about 43%, followed closely by Las Vegas at 40%. All cities but one received more than 20% of their city's general fund budget.



#### Across the eight cities, the average ratio of officers to residents was higher than in California.

The average ratio of officers to residents across the eight cities was 3.3:1,000. Atlanta and Las Vegas had the highest ratios, at 5.25 and 5.24, respectively, to 1,000 residents. The lowest ratio was in Lincoln, at just 1.2:1,000.

#### Both the number of homicides and the homicide clearance rate varied significantly across the eight cities.

The three-year homicide rate ranged from 2.8 per 100,000 residents in Lincoln to 62.1 in New Orleans. The average of all eight cities was 21.8. These cities had relatively high clearance rates, with an average of 61.3% and a median of 73%. Notably, the average was brought down significantly by the surprisingly low 12.5% clearance rate in Seattle.11

# **Correctional Agencies: Probation and Parole**

Community corrections and supervision agencies across the nation are seeing significant decreases in their caseloads, yet many have budgets that continue to grow significantly. To better understand these shifts, NICJR profiled nine agencies across five jurisdictions, including two counties (Alameda County, CA, and Cuyahoga County, OH), two states (Georgia and Maryland), and the District of Columbia, analyzing trends in budget, caseload, and staffing changes in both adult and juvenile agencies. There were similar trends in all five jurisdictions, with large decreases in agency caseloads at both the juvenile and adult levels.

Where possible, NICJR also evaluated the number of cases by risk and supervision level. Consistent with a sizable body of criminological research, our analysis found that many agencies' probation populations include a high proportion of people being supervised who are assessed as low risk, diluting the resources available to supervise and serve individuals who pose the greatest risk to public safety. 12, 13

#### **Methodology and Limitations**

NICJR selected jurisdictions of different sizes and across various US regions to understand trends at all levels of community supervision. Data were collected from the agencies through publicly available budgets; annual reports; and, when necessary, Public Records Act (PRA) requests.

Because of the variation in publicly available data, it was not always possible to collect identical data across jurisdictions, or even across time within one jurisdiction. Moreover, not all jurisdictions report disaggregated data on the types of cases they supervise consistently across documents. As a result, years for which NICJR obtained and analyzed data varied by jurisdiction, as did the specific data points examined. NICJR thus focused on changes within agencies across time. Many agencies had caseload declines beginning years before the analysis, but NICJR identified the years that had the most complete data while providing an adequate range of time for analysis.

<sup>13</sup> A Rapid Evidence Assessment of the impact of probation caseloads on reducing recidivism and other probation outcomes



<sup>12</sup> Mass Probation from Micro to Macro: Tracing the Expansion and Consequences of **Community Supervision** 

#### **Case Studies**

#### Overview of Budget and Probation Population by Jurisdiction<sup>14</sup>

Table 1: Alameda County, California

	2019	2023
Probation Department operating budget	\$156,248,561	\$205,061,956
Adults on supervision	9,032	5,000
Juvenile Probation budget <sup>15</sup>	\$88,507,822	\$93,327,166
Youth on supervision	618	116

Table 2: Cuyahoga County, Ohio

	2016	2021
Probation budget	\$13,756,298	\$14,115,736
Adults on supervision	7,075	5,144
Juvenile Probation budget	\$12,599,942.61	\$8,964,928.39
Youth on supervision	900	354

Table 3: State of Georgia

	2017	2023
Department of Community Supervision adult budget	\$174,288,742	\$174,436,073
Adults on supervision	258,843	239,036

Table 4: State of Maryland

	2017	2022
Department of Probation and Parole budget	\$115,100,00	\$116,200,000
Adults on supervision	135,868	96,471
Department of Juvenile Services budget	\$279,700,000	\$300,100,000
Youth on probation	2,296	790

<sup>14</sup> See case studies below for citations.

<sup>15</sup> Does not include Alameda County Probation Department administrative budget that spans adult and juvenile probation.

Table 5: Washington, District of Columbia

	2017	2022
Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency Community Supervision budget	\$182,721,000	\$206,006,000
Adults on supervision	16,407	6,901
Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services budget	\$101,872,794	\$83,818,591
Youth committed to Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services	223	112



#### Alameda County, California

#### Overview

The Alameda County Probation Department (ACPD) is responsible for supervising adults and juveniles on probation. Following the implementation of Public Safety Realignment in October 2011, the Probation Department also supervises some adults convicted of lower-level felonies who previously would have been supervised by the State's Division of Adult Parole Operations. On the juvenile side, ACPD conducts preadjudication investigations and houses youth who the court detains pre-adjudication; post adjudication, the Department is responsible for both supervision and placement of youth adjudicated delinquent.


In Alameda County, where Oakland is located, less than one third of both juveniles and adults under ACPD supervision have been assessed as being at high risk of recidivating. An even smaller group is assessed as being at high risk of committing violence. Notably, although Oakland comprises just 13% of the county's population, approximately half of all juveniles and adults under ACPD supervision live in Oakland. 16

#### Alameda County Adult Probation Population and Budget Trends

From 2019 to 2023, the number of adults under ACPD supervision decreased by nearly 2,900, from 8,115 people at the end of 2019 to 5,240 in mid-2023.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>16</sup> Alameda County: About Probation Data

<sup>17</sup> Supervision data are missing for 2022. 2019-2021 data were pulled from Alameda County: About Probation Data, and 2023 data were obtained through a PRA request.



Yet even as the population decreased drastically, over this same period, the ACPD budget increased by almost \$50 million, with an \$8 million increase for staffing for the Adult Probation division and a near doubling of Probation Administration costs. Half of this increase is earmarked for community-based services, which is great, but the bureaucratic delay in releasing these funds has frustrated local service providers.




Table 6: ACPD's Budget has Grown Even as the Supervision Population has Declined

Budget unit <sup>18</sup>	2019	2023
Probation administration <sup>19</sup>	\$12,413,553	\$23,132,509
Probation grants <sup>20</sup>	\$11,584,442	\$15,560,742
Probation - adult	\$31,554,247	\$39,753,568
Probation - AB109 community-based organizations (CBO) funding		\$29,517,799
Probation local community realignment	\$11,219,878	\$3,770,172
Adult Services and Administration and Grants budget	\$66,772,120	\$111,734,790
Adult Services only budget	\$42,774,125	\$73,041,539
Adults on supervision	9,032	5,162

According to data from the Probation Department, the majority of adults under supervision are not at high risk to reoffend. As of June 2023, among those who had been assessed, only 1,828 of the adults under supervision (35% of the total adult probation population, and 44% of those assessed) were considered to be at high risk to reoffend, while 787 people (18% of those assessed) were considered low risk to reoffend.<sup>21</sup>

Table 7: The Majority of Adults on **Probation** are Not High Risk<sup>22</sup>

	Low	Medium	High	Not Assessed	Total
	#	#	#	#	#
Misdemeanor probation	12	15	15	401	443
Felony probation	740	1,438	1,598	648	4,424
Mandatory supervision	3	5	6	3	17
Post-release community supervision	32	82	209	36	359
Total	787	1,540	1,828	1,088	5,243

<sup>18</sup> Alameda County Budget

<sup>19</sup> Allocation includes administration and services for juvenile probation.

<sup>20</sup> Allocation includes administration and services for juvenile probation.

<sup>21</sup> Approximately 1,000 adults under probation supervision do not have an assessed risk level, per information received in response to a PRA request.

<sup>22</sup> Data received from Alameda County Probation Department on 11/29/23 in response to PRA.

#### Alameda County Probation Juvenile Population and Budget Trends

Budget and population data on the juvenile side evidence similar trends. From 2019 to 2023, the number of youth under ACPD supervision decreased by more than half, from 824 at the end of 2019 to 367 in the middle of 2023.<sup>23</sup> Over the same period, the number of youth held in ACPD facilities decreased from 193 to 116.<sup>24</sup> However, the budget increased even as the population decreased.

Table 8: ACPD's Budget has Grown Even as the Supervision Population has **Declined** 

Budget unit <sup>25</sup>	2019	2023
Probation administration <sup>26</sup>	\$12,413,553	\$23,132,509
Probation grants <sup>27</sup>	\$11,584,442	\$15,560,742
Probation juvenile institutions	\$53,909,949	\$57,155,885
Probation Juvenile Field Services	\$34,597873	\$36,171,281
Juvenile Services and Administration and Grants budget	\$112,505,817	\$132,020,417
Juvenile Services only budget	\$88,507,822	\$93,327,166
Youth on supervision <sup>28</sup>	824	618
Youth in facilities	193	116

In the Juvenile Division, of the 367 youth for whom ACPD provided assessment data, more than two-thirds (67%) were assessed as low or moderate risk, and only one-third were assessed as high risk (33%); only one youth was assessed as very high risk. While these risk levels are consistent with many agencies across the country, they represent an opportunity for Alameda County to safely and effectively reduce the number of youth on supervision and better focus on the smaller number of youth at higher risk.

<sup>23</sup> Supervision data are missing for 2022. 2019-2021 data were pulled from Alameda County: About Probation Data, and 2023 data were obtained through a PRA request.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Alameda County Budget

<sup>26</sup> Allocation includes administration and services for juvenile probation.

<sup>27</sup> Allocation includes administration and services for juvenile probation.

<sup>28</sup> Includes Community Supervision, Home Supervision, Intake/Investigations, Placements, and Warrant caseloads: https://probation.acgov.org/researchdataevaluation.page

Table 9: More than Two-Thirds of Youth on Supervision are Low or Moderate Risk

Assessed Risk Level	N	%
Low	54	17%
Moderate	156	50%
High	103	33%
Very high	1	0%
Awaiting final review <sup>29</sup>	34	N/A
Pending assessment <sup>30</sup>	19	N/A



#### Cuyahoga County, Ohio

#### Overview

The Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas (CCCCP) houses the Adult and Juvenile Probation Departments, which oversee pretrial services and probation supervision in Cuyahoga County (whose county seat is Cleveland). Since 2016, expenditures on adult probation in Cuyahoga County have remained stagnant while caseloads have decreased. Moreover, probation is supervising a higher percentage of lower-risk adults than it was in 2016. Likewise, in 2022, the Juvenile Probation Department (JPD) oversaw a population that was only one-third of its 2016 caseload. However, there was a decrease in budget during this same period.

#### **Adult Supervision Population and Budget Trends**

CCCCP has seen a decline in its adult supervision population that has not been reflected in either staffing or budget changes over time. The number of individuals on parole decreased by almost 30% from 2016 to 2021, from 7,075 individuals to 5,144.31,32 Despite a consistent decrease in the number of adults on supervision, the number of probation officers increased between 2016 and 2020, after which there was a significant drop in officers that resulted in a net decrease.<sup>33</sup> However, the net decrease in officers does not correspond with the decrease in caseloads.

In the same period, the combined budget for the Probation Department and Court Psychiatric Clinic, another diversion pathway for adults that is funded in tandem with Probation, increased slightly, from \$13.8 million to \$14.1 million.34

<sup>29</sup> Percentages exclude individuals without risk assessment scores.

<sup>30</sup> Percentages exclude individuals without risk assessment scores.

<sup>31</sup> Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 2016 Annual Report

<sup>32</sup> Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 2021 Annual Report

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

Table 10: Consistent **Budgets** and Decreasing Caseloads

	2016	2021
Adult Probation actual expenditures	\$13,756,298	\$14,115,736
Adults on supervision	7,075	5,144
Probation officers	142	136

Individuals in Cuyahoga County are supervised on probation based on their risk level assessment or specialized needs. The proportion of individuals placed on what the Department calls "Extremely High Risk Supervision" decreased from 2019 to 2021, while the percentage of individuals on Low Risk Supervision and Low Moderate Risk Supervision increased.35

Almost half (approximately 44%) of cases are at or below Low Moderate Risk Supervision. A small majority of individuals on probation are considered Moderate Risk or High Risk Supervision. The smallest group under supervision is the Extremely High Risk group.<sup>36</sup>

**Table 11: CCCCP** Supervision Levels Over Time<sup>37</sup>

Year	Low Risk Assessment	Low Moderate Risk Assessment	Moderate Risk Assessment	High Risk Assessment	Extremely High Risk Assessment
2016 %	16%	5%	40%	36%	2.5%
2016 N	875	291	2,156	1,953	137
2021 %	24.63%	5.72%	36.47%	22.16%	1.48%
2021 N	1,267	294	1,876	1,140	76

#### **Juvenile Supervision Population and Budget Trends**

From 2016 to 2021, the Juvenile Probation Department saw an almost 60% decrease in cases, from 900 youth to just 354. There was a corresponding decrease in the budget from \$12.6 million to \$8.9 million. 38,39

**Table 12:** JPD Population and Expenditures

	2016	2021
Juvenile Probation actual expenditures	\$12,599,943	\$8,964,928
Youth on supervision	900	354

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> These percentages are calculated using the total number of individuals on risk-based supervision, not the total number of individuals on any form of supervision.

<sup>38</sup> Cuyahoga County Court of Juvenile Pleas- Juvenile Division 2016 Annual Report

<sup>39</sup> Cuyahoga County Court of Juvenile Pleas- Juvenile Division 2021 Annual Report



#### Overview

The Georgia Department of Community Supervision (DCS) oversees the state's probation and parole. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the State of Georgia has the highest rate of population under supervision of any state in the country—1 in 23 adults in Georgia is under supervision, compared to a national average of 1 in 66.40

#### **Adult Supervision Population and Budget Trends**

Between 2017 and 2022, the total number of people supervised by Georgia DCS declined from 258,843 to 239,036. Staffing numbers within the Department also decreased in this time; however, total expenditures remained more or less the same.

**Table 13:** DCS Supervised Population and Expenditures<sup>41</sup>

	2017	2022
DCS Adult Supervision budget	\$174,288,74242	\$174,436,073
Adults on supervision	258,843	239,036
Total staff	1,764	1,584
Average caseload	139	148




#### Maryland

#### Overview

The Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (DPSCS) houses the Division of Parole and Probation (DPP), which oversees all cases of adult criminal supervision. As is true for many community corrections agencies in recent years, its budget has grown while its caseload has decreased.

A separate state agency, the Department of Juvenile Services (DJS), oversees youth under supervision in Maryland, as well as youth in preadjudication detention and post-adjudication custodial placement. In the past decade, the number of youth under supervision in the state decreased by 50%. The Department's budget, however, has seen a net increase.



<sup>40</sup> Georgia Department of Community Supervision, 2023 Annual Report

<sup>41</sup> Georgia Department of Community Supervision Publications

<sup>42</sup> Georgia Department of Community Supervision, 2017 Annual Report

#### **Adult Supervision Population and Budget Trends**

DPSCS's total supervised cases across supervision types decreased by 29% between 2017 and 2022, from 135,868 total cases to 96,471. Probation cases also decreased by about a third, from 90,487 to 67,069. At the same time, DPSCS has experienced a significant decline in staffing agency wide. Within DPP, the number of staff has decreased by over 56% since 2017, from 1,268 to 548.

However, the Department's budget has not followed the same downward trend. The most recent DPSCS budget marks an increase of approximately \$170 million since 2017, and the portion of funds allocated to community supervision has remained static.<sup>43</sup> Notably, the agency has over 1,400 vacant positions (400 over the predicted amount), which adds \$37 million to the budget.<sup>44</sup>

**Table 14: DPSCS** Population and **Expenditures** 

	2017	2022	2023
Total DPSCS supervision cases	135,868 <sup>45</sup>	96,471	
Total DPSCS probation cases	90,48746	67,06947	
DPSCS budget	\$1.39 billion <sup>48</sup>	\$1.54 billion <sup>49</sup>	\$1.43 billion <sup>50</sup>
DPP budget	\$115.1 million	\$113.5 million <sup>51</sup>	\$116.2 million <sup>52</sup>
Parole and probation staff	1,268 <sup>53</sup>	762 <sup>54</sup>	54855

The Department of Probation and Parole assigns its cases to one of five levels of supervision. According to its Annual Data Dashboard, a large majority of DPP supervision cases are on low or low-moderate supervision, 56 making up 85% of all cases that have been assigned a supervision level.<sup>57</sup> This means that fewer than 12% of cases are on either High or Violence Prevention Initiative (VPI) supervision, the highest levels in the rubric.

Notably, many cases on lower levels of supervision have been sentenced to remain on probation for many years. A total of 479 individuals on low supervision have sentence lengths of 10–15 years—representing half of all cases of that supervision length.<sup>58</sup>



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43 DPSCS FY 2024 Budget
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<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> DPSCS FY 2023 Budget

<sup>46</sup> DPSCS FY 2024 Budget

<sup>48</sup> DPSCS FY 2019 Budget Overview

<sup>49</sup> DPSCS FY 2022 Budget

<sup>50</sup> DPSCS FY 2024 Budget

<sup>51</sup> DPSCS FY 2022 Budget

<sup>52</sup> DPSCS FY 2023 Budget

<sup>53</sup> DPSCS FY 2017 Budget

<sup>54</sup> DPSCS FY 2023 Budget

<sup>55</sup> DPP Data Dashboard, Overview

<sup>56</sup> DPP Data Dashboard, Demographics

<sup>57</sup> DPP reports that about 29.3% of its caseload is awaiting assignment.

<sup>58</sup> DPP Data Dashboard, Caseload Overview

**Table 15: DPP Supervision** Levels

	Low	Low- Moderate	Moderate	High	VPI	Review <sup>60</sup>
Active DPP supervision cases	11,764	6,191	781	1,775	695	8,787
Percentage of total (includes cases in review)	39.22%	20.64%	2.6%	5.92%	2.32%	29.3%
Percentage of cases assigned to supervision level	55.47%	29.19%	3.68%	8.37%	3.28%	

#### **Juvenile Supervision Population and Budget Trends**

The Maryland Department of Juvenile Services oversees juvenile detention, community placement, and community supervision for youth in Maryland. The total number of juvenile complaints brought to DJS care decreased by half between 2014 and 2023, from 24,996 to 12,388.61 The Department's budget also decreased slightly during that time, from \$286 million in 2014 to \$279.7 million in 2017; however, after 2017 it began to climb again, reaching \$300.1 million in 2023. In this same period, the Department's Community Supervision budget increased by about \$4 million, despite the reduction in caseloads.

As the DJS budget increased from 2017-2023, the Department saw a 67% decrease in its Community Supervision caseload, from 4,268 to 1,407. Staffing also decreased, but not at the same pace.

Table 16: DJS Population and Expenditures 2017-2023

	201762	202363
Total DJS budget	\$279,700,000	\$300,100,000
Youth Community Supervision budget (Pre-Court, Probation, Aftercare)	\$40,836,200	\$44,114,700
Total Community Service staffing	537	476
Case Management Specialists	328	283
Youth on probation	2,296	799

<sup>60</sup> Review is not a static level of supervision but the status of individuals while they are being evaluated. Following review, clients are assigned to a supervision level.

<sup>61</sup> Maryland DJS Data Resource Guide, 2023

<sup>62</sup> Maryland DJS Data Resource Guide, 2017

<sup>63</sup> Maryland DJS Data Resource Guide, 2023



#### Overview

The Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency (CSOSA) is a federal agency with jurisdiction over Washington, DC. Within CSOSA is the Community Supervision Program (CSP), which oversees adults on probation and parole. In recent years, CSOSA's budget has increased while caseloads and staff case ratios have decreased.

#### **Adult Criminal Supervision Trends**

CSOSA saw a decrease in its caseload between 2017 and 2022, from over 16,000 cases to just above 6,900. CSP staffing also decreased in this time, from 877 in 2017 to 780 in 2022. This amounted to only a slight decrease in caseload ratios, from 44:1 to 37:1.

In the midst of these decreases, the Agency's budget increased by almost \$24 million, to \$206,006,000. The budget has continued to increase slightly since then, with an approved 2024 budget of \$208,204,000.

**Table 17: CSOSA** Population and Expenditures, 2017-2022

	2017	2022
Community Supervision Program budget	\$182,721,00064	\$206,006,00065
Caseload	44:166	37:1
Staff	877	780
Adults on CSOSA supervision	16,407	6,901 <sup>67</sup>

The Community Supervision Program assigns each case to one of four levels of supervision, displayed in table 18 below. While a small majority of CSP cases are assigned to the maximum or intensive supervision levels, there are almost an equal number of minimum and medium supervision cases. Of the cases that had been assigned a supervision level at the time of data collection, about 43% were classified as medium or below.

**Table 18: CSP Supervision** Levels

	Minimum	Medium	Maximum	Intensive	TBD	NA/ Missing
Percentage of total	12.07%	29.98%	30.72%	23.85%	1.29%	2.10%
Percentage of assigned	12.49%	31.03%	31.79%	24.69%	1.33%	2.17%

<sup>64</sup> CSOSA 2017 Budget

<sup>65</sup> CSOSA 2024 Budget

<sup>66</sup> COSA 2019 Budget


<sup>67</sup> CSOSA 2024 Budget

#### **Juvenile Supervision Population and Budget Trends**



Youth on supervision in DC are under the care of two separate agencies, the Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services (DYRS) and the Department of Court Social Services.

DYRS operates the City's detention center, post-adjudication facility, and youth parole. Since 2017, there has been a steady decrease in the number of total youth (both detained and committed) that DYRS serves. The Department served an average daily population (ADP) of 223 committed youth in 2017. By January 2022, this number declined to 112 youth. In March of 2024, there were only 161 total youth being served by DYRS, including 90 committed youth.



While the Department's budget experienced an overall downward trend from 2017 to 2024, current DYRS staffing (539) is similar to that of 2017 (554). As a result, there are now more than twice as many DYRS staff than there are youth being supervised and served by the Department. Notably, in 2009, when there were more than 1,000 youth committed to DYRS, the Department's budget was smaller than in 2022.

Table 19: **DYRS** Population and Expenditures, 2017-2024

	2017	2022	2023	2024
DYRS budget	\$101,872,79468	\$83,818,591	\$89,580,423	\$87,828,13169
DYRS staff	554	<b>498</b> <sup>70</sup>	585 <sup>71</sup>	539 <sup>72</sup>
Total DYRS cases	1,937 <sup>73</sup>	30274	167 <sup>75</sup>	161 <sup>76</sup>
Youth facilities' average daily population	223 <sup>77</sup>	112 <sup>78</sup>	122	90 <sup>79</sup>

<sup>68</sup> DYRS FY 2018 Budget

<sup>69</sup> DYRS FY 2024 Budget

<sup>70</sup> Ibid.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

<sup>73</sup> DYRS 2019 Annual Report, Population

<sup>74</sup> DYRS Performance Oversight Hearing Report, 2022

<sup>75</sup> DYRS Population Report, Accessed December 2023

<sup>76</sup> DYRS Population Report, Accessed March 2024

<sup>77</sup> DYRS 2019 Annual Report, Population

<sup>78</sup> DYRS Performance Oversight Hearing Report, 2022

<sup>79</sup> DYRS Population Report, March 4, 2024

# Reduce. Improve. Reinvest.

The findings of this report clearly demonstrate that significant policing and criminal justice resources are directed toward low-level incidents and individuals. While concerning, this also provides an opportunity for improvement.

> The NICJR justice reform framework of Reduce, Improve, and Reinvest can be used to transform systems and increase public safety:



Use community-based alternative response programs to reduce, if not eliminate, police officers from responding to low-level and noncriminal calls for service. Focus probation and parole supervision on the smaller number of people who are assessed as high risk.

Increase the quality of policing and repair the relationship between police and community. Improve the quantity and quality of services, supports, and opportunities available to youth and adults under supervision. Improve the outcomes of youth and adults in the criminal justice system.

Capture and use the savings from a reduced criminal justice system to invest in communities most impacted by crime, violence, and incarceration.

The following sections profile services, programs, and strategies that can be used to effectively reduce and improve the criminal justice system and policing.

#### **Alternative Response to Calls for Service**

There is a growing recognition of the benefits of community-based responses to certain types of nonviolent calls for service.

In 2020, as calls grew in Seattle to significantly reduce the Seattle Police Department (SPD) budget, SPD publicly argued that doing so would be "catastrophic for public safety in the city of Seattle."80 Yet internally, the Department acknowledged that "up to 45% of SPD patrol service hours do not require an officer,"81 and surveyed command staff identified multiple areas of service that would be better responded to by parties other than a sworn officer.82

In March of 2023, the Los Angeles Police Protective League (the police officers' union) released a proposal identifying 28 types of calls to which LAPD sworn officers should no longer respond, suggesting that "ceasing to respond to certain non-emergency calls... would allow Los Angeles police officers to more swiftly respond to other emergencies, improve neighborhood safety, engage in community policing as it was originally envisioned, increase crime clearance rates, and improve police/community outcomes."83



Police response can also have specific negative implications. The Center for American Progress notes that "police officers may unintentionally escalate a situation, simply by showing up on the scene," particularly for people with behavioral health disorders who have experienced negative contacts with the justice system and within communities of color, as "Calls for service related to minor incidents are more likely to result in justice system involvement for Black people."84

One framework for alternative responses to low-level and noncriminal CFS is NICJR's Tiered Dispatch model. This model was created in 2021, when NICJR worked with several cities' Reimagining Public Safety committees and task forces. Within Tiered Dispatch, each CFS is assigned to one of four tiers based on call type: 1) noncriminal; 2) misdemeanor; 3) nonviolent felony; and 4) violent felony.85 The tier determines whether a Community Emergency Response Network (CERN) team, police officers, or both are dispatched to a call.

As more calls are handled by CERN teams, the reduced burden ideally allows for reductions in patrol staffing and increased law enforcement focus on solving crimes and addressing serious threats to public safety.

There are many proven and promising models for CERN, some of which are highlighted below. Additional models are described in NICJR's New and Emerging Models of Community Safety and Policing report.

<sup>80</sup> Chief Best's Message to Officers on Potential Cuts to Police Budget

**<sup>81</sup>** Budget Change Decision Points

<sup>82</sup> Derailing the defund: How SPD manipulated the media narrative around the 2020 protests

<sup>83</sup> Los Angeles Police Protective League Alternative Response Proposal

<sup>84</sup> The Community Responder Model

<sup>85</sup> Reimagining Public Safety in Berkeley

Crisis Assistance Helping Out On The Streets (CAHOOTS).86 Perhaps the most well-known of CERN model is CAHOOTS, a mobile crisis intervention program established in 1989 in Eugene, Oregon. This free program is available twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week to intervene in mental or emotional health crises both without, or in partnership with, law enforcement. CAHOOTS is directed by the White Bird Clinic in partnership with the City of Eugene.

Each CAHOOTS unit is comprised of an emergency medical technician (EMT) and a mental health service provider.<sup>87</sup> Staff are required to complete 40 hours of classroom education and over 500 hours of field work supervised by a qualified guide. Training focuses on de-escalation methods and emergency response services.88 CAHOOTS personnel are able to perform wellness checks, offer mental health services and substance use disorder resources. administer first aid, provide mediation assistance, and provide voluntary medical transport.

Each team includes an EMT + a mental health provider.

**CAHOOTS** handles 17-20% of Eugene's 911 calls.

Saves the city an estimated 8.5 million annually in public safety costs.

CAHOOTS has become an integral part of the CFS response system in Eugene. An analysis from the Eugene Police Department Crime Analysis Unit found that in 2021, CAHOOTS was dispatched to approximately 17-20% of the city's total CFS, most often for welfare checks, transport for mental health and non-emergency medical services, and public assistance such as counseling and injury evaluation.<sup>89</sup> Overall, an estimated 3-8% of CFS to which CAHOOTS is dispatched represent true diversion in that they would otherwise have been responded to by police, saving the City of Eugene an estimated \$8.5 million in public safety spending annually.90 In addition to local successes, the CAHOOTS model has been adopted and adapted in a number of communities throughout the US.

Support Team Assistance Response (STAR). Based on the CAHOOTS program, the Denver STAR program was launched as a pilot in 2020 via a joint effort between many stakeholders, including the Denver Police Department (DPD), Denver's Paramedic Division, Mental Health Center of Denver, and community-based organizations.

Similar to CAHOOTS, STAR is a community responder model that provides mobile crisis response for community members experiencing problems related to mental health, depression, poverty, homelessness, or substance abuse issues. 92 Each STAR team includes two healthcare professionals (typically a mental health clinician and paramedic) who respond in a designated vehicle. Teams



STAR reduced low-level **crime reports by 34%,** with no impact on serious crimes.

are dispatched via 911 to low risk, low acuity crisis calls, 93 but they are also able to respond to calls from uniformed police and initiate engagement in the field on their own. 94 As of July 2022, the three most common types of calls to which STAR responds are welfare checks, trespassing / unwanted parties, and requests for assistance (resource information, a courtesy ride, etc.).95

**86 CAHOOTS** 

**87 CAHOOTS Brochure** 

88 Case Study: CAHOOTS

**89 CAHOOTS Program Analysis** 

90 What is CAHOOTS?

91 Support Team Assisted Response

92 Support Team Assisted Response

93 STAR 2022 Mid-Year Report

94 A community response approach to mental health and substance abuse crises reduced crime

95 STAR 2022 Mid-Year Report

The STAR program has seen great success thus far. A quasi-experimental study of the model found "robust evidence that the program reduced reports of targeted, less serious crimes (e.g., trespassing, public disorder, and resisting arrest) by 34% and had no detectable effect on more serious crimes."96 Based on the success of the pilot, Denver formally adopted the program in 2021 and is expanding beyond the pilot service area to serve the entire city. The program is also expanding operating hours to respond to calls from 6 AM to 10 PM seven days a week.

Crisis and Incident Response through Community-led Engagement (CIRCLE).<sup>97</sup> CIRCLE is a 24/7 alternative response program in Los Angeles that sends trained crisis response teams via 911 dispatch to respond to nonviolent, noncriminal, and not medically urgent CFS related to unhoused individuals.

Each CIRCLE team includes a licensed mental health clinician and two outreach workers with lived experience. The teams complete extensive training in topics such as trauma-informed care, advanced de-escalation techniques, LGBTQ cultural competency, and CPR and first aid. Teams are equipped with a CIRCLE vehicle stocked with supplies such as water, snacks, clothing, and NARCAN, and each community served by CIRCLE has a Decompression Center where the teams can bring unhoused individuals to rest, meet with a mental health clinician, and receive refreshments. The work of CIRCLE teams is complemented by outreach teams of formerly unhoused people who proactively engage unhoused people in the CIRCLE service area.

CIRCLE is a 24/7 crisis response program in Los Angeles for nonviolent, noncriminal incidents.

By November 2022, CIRCLE diverted over

> emergency calls, and addressed

> 12,400 incidents.

Although the CIRCLE program is relatively new, it has shown promise thus far. The program began in early 2022 as a pilot in Hollywood

and Venice. By November 2022, over 2,300 911/877-ASK-LAPD calls had been diverted to CIRCLE, and over 12,400 incidents had been proactively addressed by CIRCLE teams. 98 Following this early success, the program expanded to additional locations in the City. 99 Notably, LAPD leadership have been vocal in praising the program. 100

California Department of Health Care Services Crisis Care Mobile Units (CCMU).<sup>101</sup> Drawing upon federal and state funding, California has made making major investments to increase mobile crisis care throughout the state. The State has awarded more than \$200 million to 78 city, county, and tribal behavioral health agencies to create or improve CCMUs designed to provide timely, field-based services to people experiencing mental health and substance use crises. 102 While each agency has a unique approach to its CCMUs, many are using them as a means for alternative response to CFS in the vein of CAHOOTS and STAR.

Reimagining Public Safety Project.<sup>103</sup> Although CAHOOTS has been operational for more than 30 years, many alternative response programs are young, and numerous jurisdictions are currently planning and launching their own approaches to non-police CFS response. Building upon this momentum, the New York University School of Law Policing Project launched the Reimagining Public Safety Project, an "expansive effort to learn about and support jurisdictions redesigning public safety systems." Through robust research, the project aims to develop a holistic first response model, with a toolkit for implementation, that can respond to the full range of 911 calls rather than diverting only a small portion of calls away from law enforcement.

<sup>96</sup> A community response approach to mental health and substance abuse crises reduced crime

<sup>97</sup> CIRCLE FAQ

<sup>98</sup> Expansion of Unarmed Response Program

<sup>99</sup> Confronting the Mental Health Crisis: Mayor Bass Announces CIRCLE Program Expansion to Westside Communities

<sup>100</sup> When Not to Send the Police: A Conversation with LAPD Chief Michel Moore

<sup>101</sup> Crisis Care Mobile Units Program Grant

<sup>102</sup> CCMU Program Funding Fact Sheet

<sup>103</sup> About Reimagining Public Safety

#### **Improving Policing**



Implementing an alternative response model increases the ability of police departments to focus resources on what is needed mostsolving crimes, engaging in focused enforcement to reduce gun violence, and responding to immediate and serious threats to public safety.

Many police department budgets have increased significantly over time, vet homicide clearance rates have fallen nationwide. In a 2023 article, the Guardian noted that "Over the past four decades, homicide clearance rates—the metric used to determine how many homicides police solve—have decreased from about 71% in 1980 to an all-time low of about 50% in 2020."104 While the causes of this decrease are

multifaceted, it is clear that simply increasing police budgets does not solve more murders, a significant factor in making communities safer.

In Oakland, in 2021, OPD received 44% of the City's General Fund, and more than half of that funding was allocated to patrol. According to the former Captain of the Homicide Division, with limited budget and staffing, OPD homicide detectives each investigated up to 12 murders per year, while the Police Executive Research Forum recommends that homicide detectives investigate no more than four to six homicides annually.<sup>105</sup> These constraints are evident in investigative results: The homicide clearance rate in Oakland is routinely below 50%. Less than half of the people who commit murder in Oakland are ever brought to justice.

The research of Economist David Bierk reinforces this notion. He analyzed data covering homicides in approximately 50 of the largest US cities from 2007 to 2017, finding that "the way large city police departments have historically spent their funds, more funding has not helped catch more murderers."106 Notably, this same study found that the likelihood of a homicide being cleared was significantly lower for Black and Hispanic adult male victims and for homicides in minority neighborhoods. Consistent with this finding, the Police Scorecard Project notes that nationwide, "police reported finding a suspect in 84% of homicides of white victims from 2013–2020 compared to only 64% of Latinx victims and 57% of Black victims."107

While homicide clearance is only one metric of a department's effectiveness, clearances do play a crucial role in violence reduction. Retaliation and new cycles of violence are far less likely when individuals believe they will likely be caught and prosecuted for their crimes. When community members trust that police will use fair procedures when dealing with their community and will follow through and effectively address crime, 108 they become more likely to cooperate in investigations and less likely to take matters into their own hands.

There is evidence, though, that investing in the right policing resources can have a real impact on safety. After years of lower-than-average homicide clearance rates, the Boston Police Department implemented the Boston Homicide Clearance Project to improve their post-homicide criminal investigation processes and practices. A rigorous evaluation of the project found that "the intervention significantly increased key

<sup>104 &#</sup>x27;Far from justice': why are nearly half of US murders going unsolved?

<sup>105</sup> Promising Strategies for Strengthening Homicide Investigations

<sup>106</sup> Does greater police funding help catch more murderers?

<sup>107</sup> The Police Scorecard Project

<sup>108</sup> Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People Help the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?

investigative activities and improved clearance rates relative to existing homicide clearance trends in other Massachusetts and US jurisdictions."109

These findings point to the value of reinvesting cost savings from reduced patrol units into increasing the number of investigators, gun violence reduction units, viable alternative response programs, and communitybased violence intervention. 110

#### **Highly Accountable Learning Organization**

As a police department focuses on serious crime and violence, it should also work to improve relations with the community it serves and become a better organized and well-functioning department.

NICJR developed the concept of a Highly Accountable Learning Organization (HALO), a police department that is transparent, accountable, and data-driven, and that adheres to performance management and continuous quality improvement. A HALO police department is continuously assessing, learning, and improving.

#### A HALO police department:

- Recruits and retains a workforce that is reflective of the community it serves
- Provides thorough, high quality, and intensive training that well exceeds minimums required by state mandates
- Maintains strict hiring standards designed to screen out candidates who were fired or forced to resign from previous law enforcement positions, candidates who show signs of racial bias, and candidates who approach policing with a warrior mentality<sup>111</sup>
- Implements Early Warning Systems that use data-driven and technologically savvy approaches to tracking staff performance and identifying emerging issues of inappropriate, abusive, and/or racially biased behavior
- Has effective mechanisms in place to promptly intervene and hold staff accountable when problematic behavior or misconduct are identified
- Systemically reviews officer performance through regular review of body-worn camera footage, service complaints, uses of force, and more
- Has policies in place to limit use of deadly force to situations of last resort where an armed suspect is using or threatening to use a firearm and to ensure that any other use of force is necessary and proportional
- Ensures transparency through real-time data dashboards or regular reports to the public on traffic stops, arrests, complaints, and uses of force, including totals and breakdowns by race, gender, neighborhood, and other key outcomes
- Requires employees to have strong commitment to learning and engaging with other agencies and professional organizations to ensure the agency uses evidence-based practices for internal police accountability and violence prevention programs in their community

<sup>109</sup> Improving Police Clearance Rates of Shootings: A Review of the Evidence

<sup>110</sup> Effective Community-Based Violence Reduction Strategies

<sup>111</sup> From Warriors to Guardians: Recommitting American Police Culture to Democratic Ideals

Becoming a HALO department may include joining a larger movement such as the Georgetown University Active Bystandership for Law Enforcement (ABLE) Project. ABLE serves as a national hub for training, technical assistance, and research focused on establishing "a police culture in which officers routinely intervene—and accept interventions—as necessary to: prevent misconduct, avoid police mistakes, and promote officer health and wellness."112 Through ABLE, law enforcement agencies are able to receive training along with a host of other resources to assist them in advancing their own bystandership strategies.

ABLE was modelled after the Ethical Policing is Courageous (EPIC) program, which was created by the New Orleans Police Department and community partners. The program "educates,



empowers, and supports the officers on the streets to play a meaningful role in 'policing' one another." 113 EPIC aims to alter the culture surrounding policing to limit police misbehavior and promote a collaborative environment by training officers to be accountable to each other and intervene before an unlawful act takes place, irrespective of hierarchy.

A HALO police department may also adopt one of several evidence-based policing strategies that have been shown to be effective in reducing crime, resolving incidents, and improving the quality of policing without the use of heavy handed enforcement tactics that can erode public trust and increase the risk of excessive force. Several examples of such strategies are included in NICJR's report on New and Emerging Models of Community Safety and Policing.

#### **Community Violence Intervention and Gun Violence Reduction Strategies**

Cost savings realized through reduced reliance on law enforcement to respond to CFS and improved policing practices should be reinvested in community violence intervention (CVI) and gun violence reduction strategies (GVRS).

NICJR supports the development and implementation of gun violence reduction strategies in several cities across the county. GVRS is a comprehensive, data-driven, multifaceted strategy that specifically identifies the small number of individuals who are at very high risk of being involved in gun violence and employs intensive interventions with those individuals.

There are several other community violence intervention (CVI) strategies that, when implemented with fidelity, have been successful at reducing gun violence, even among those most entrenched in gun violence. NICJR's report on Effective Community-Based Violence Reduction Strategies highlights GVRS and other effective CVI initiatives. NICJR also partnered with other national technical assistance organizations to engage hundreds of CVI professionals to develop a national Community Violence Intervention Action Plan that includes numerous recommendations and program profiles.

<sup>112</sup> Active Bystandership for Law Enforcement (ABLE) Project 113 What is EPIC?

#### **Reforming Community Corrections: Probation and Parole**

Only a small percentage of individuals on probation or parole are assessed as being at high risk of re-offense. Even among those considered high risk, most assessment tools do not differentiate between risk for violent offenses and all other types of re-offense.

At the same time, many people on probation and parole are subject to ineffective, confusing, and unnecessarily lengthy supervision conditions set by judges and parole boards that do not account for an individual's offense, risk, or needs. The Vera Institute notes that these conditions can range from the obvious ("Report as directed by your officer") to the nearly impossible ("Refrain from possessing or consuming alcoholic beverages").114 Those who cannot meet these conditions are at risk of incarceration.

The same Vera report goes on to explain that "Decades of research confirm...that overly supervising lowrisk probationers and parolees is likely to produce worse outcomes than essentially leaving them alone." This is particularly true for people of color, who are "more likely than white people to be under community supervision, to be charged with a technical violation, and to be incarcerated for that violation."115

In Mass Supervision, former New York City Probation Commissioner Vincent Schiraldi summarizes these dynamics: "supervising more people on probation and parole does not improve safety and is associated with increased risk of incarceration. Intensive supervision is no more (and often less) effective than less stringent forms of supervision, and it generates more incarceration of technical violations."116

In addition to the toll on individuals and communities, revocations are wildly expensive. A 2019 Council of State Governments (CSG) Justice Center study found that 45% of state prison admissions are due to violations of probation or parole for new offenses or technical violations, and that technical violations make up nearly a quarter of all state prison admissions.<sup>117</sup> CSG also found "on any given day, 280,000 people in prison—nearly 1 in 4—are incarcerated as a result of a supervision violation, costing states more than \$9.3 billion annually."

Community supervision agencies can reorient both time and money to focus on the relatively small number of people assessed as high risk. There is also great potential to reduce the length of supervision terms based on more robust assessment, further increasing staff capacity to focus on those with the greatest needs. Additionally, incarceration should not be a response to technical violations of probation or parole.



Reinvesting resources that we now waste imprisoning people for rule violations holds much greater potential for rebuilding communities that have suffered under decades of mass incarceration and mass supervision, and centuries of structural racism.

Cost savings from better assessment and reduced supervision terms can be reinvested into evidence-based, community-led resources and supports such as vocational training, job placement, housing, education—which can address the root causes of crime and violence. As Schiraldi says, "Reinvesting resources that we now waste imprisoning people for rule violations holds much greater potential for rebuilding communities that have suffered under decades of mass incarceration and mass supervision, and centuries of structural racism."

<sup>114</sup> The Potential of Community Corrections to Improve Safety and Reduce Incarceration

<sup>115</sup> Explainer: How 'Technical Violations' Drive Incarceration

<sup>116</sup> Schiraldi, V. (2023). Mass Supervision: Probation, Parole, and the Illusion of Safety and Freedom. The New Press.

<sup>117</sup> Confined and Costly: How Supervision Violations Are Filling Prisons and Burdening Budgets

# Conclusion

There is a false narrative and false dichotomy that increasing public safety requires increasing law enforcement, and that reforming and improving law enforcement can lead to increased crime. The reality is that police and criminal justice system reform can result in increased community safety.

Too many law enforcement and criminal justice system resources are focused on incidents and individuals that can be safely and effectively addressed by alternative means, allowing policing and correctional resources to be used to reduce and prevent serious crime and violence.

The research presented in this report show both the need for vast improvement and the opportunity for great success. There can be both justice reform and increased public safety.

NICJR encourages cities, counties, and states to become Just and Safe jurisdictions, which includes:

- Implementing effective community-based alternative response programs that can relieve police of having to respond to noncriminal and low-level calls for service
- Significantly reducing police response to low-level and noncriminal calls for service, and thereby responsibly and gradually reducing the patrol division of police departments
- Reassigning officers from patrol to increase staffing of proactive violence reduction units and criminal investigation units, especially nonfatal shooting and homicide detectives
- Developing police departments into Highly Accountable Learning Organizations
- Reduce Improve Reinvest: Reducing the size of criminal justice agencies; vastly improving their operations and the outcomes of system impacted youth and adults; and reinvesting savings from a reduced system back into the communities impacted most by crime, violence, and incarceration

Taken together, the changes described in this report can increase community safety, reduce violent crime, and also reform policing and the criminal justice system. Focusing on serious crime and violence, more effective alternative responses, and increasing community-based services will improve public safety while also building more just systems for all.

WE CAN ACHIEVE BOTH JUSTICE AND SAFETY.

## **Appendix A: City-Level Findings**

#### Berkeley, CA



2021 Population:

117,145



2021 Number of Officers:

**181** 



Police-to-Resident Ratio:

1.6:1,000




2021 General Fund **Berkeley PD Allotment:** 


**38.3%** 



2021 Berkeley **PD Patrol Budget:** 

**58.1%** of GF Allocation<sup>118</sup>





<sup>118</sup> City of Berkeley Fiscal Years 2020 and 2021 Adopted Biennial Budget

<sup>119</sup> From 2017 to 2019, Berkeley Police Department received 215,934 calls for service. Of those calls, 70,782 (32.78%) were responded to by an officer; 12,948 of calls responded to by an officer were administrative in nature and 986 did not specify the nature of the call. These calls were removed from the analysis.





2021 Population:

102,338



2021 Number of Officers:

103





Police-to-**Resident Ratio:** 

1:1,000



2021 General Fund Chico PD Allotment:





<sup>120</sup> City of Chico 2021-22 Final Annual Budget

<sup>121</sup> Chico redacted details about calls they remarked as "sensitive" such as those involving children and/or sex crimes. These redactions have likely reduced the serious violent felony category.

<sup>122</sup> Chico had 315,618 documented calls for service between 2019-2021. Of those, 163,079 (51.2%) calls were dispatched. The 152,539 calls removed during analysis included administrative and on-view calls



544,510



2021 Number of Officers:

838



Police-to-**Resident Ratio:** 

1.5:1,000




2021 General Fund Fresno PD Allotment:


51.6%



2021 Fresno PD Patrol Budget:

of GF Allocation<sup>123</sup>





<sup>123</sup> City of Fresno Fiscal Year 2021 Final Revised Budget

<sup>124</sup> After removing 96 duplicate calls, Fresno received 649,171 calls for service between 2019-February 2022. After dropping calls that were not dispatched, administrative calls, and on-view calls, there were 615,444 calls remaining. Certain cases had redacted data, including date of occurrence, which did not allow for accurate removal of cases after December 31, 2021. Redacted cases were not removed prior to analysis, as these cases were related to sortable incidents such as mental health crises and violent sexual offenses.

#### **Long Beach, CA**



2021 Population:

456,062



2021 Number of Officers:

**795** 



Police-to-Resident Ratio:

1.7:1,000




2021 General Fund Long Beach PD Allotment:


**50%** 



2021 Long Beach PD Patrol Budget:

of GF Allocation<sup>125</sup>





<sup>125</sup> City of Long Beach Fiscal Year 2021 Adopted Budget

<sup>126</sup> The Long Beach Police Department received 1,281,285 calls for service from 2020-2022. After dropping administrative calls and calls that were not dispatched, 820,926 calls were analyzed.

## 🎗 Los Angeles, CA



2021 Population:

3,849,297



2021 Number of Officers:

9,457



Police-to-**Resident Ratio:** 

2.5:1,000




2021 General Fund Los Angeles PD Allotment:


26.4%



2021 Los Angeles PD Patrol Budget:

of GF Allocation 127





128 The Los Angeles Police Department received 4,761,230 calls for service from 2018-2020. Of these, 1,762,494 were officerinitiated stops and 61,439 administrative calls that were dropped from the analysis. 2,937,297 calls were analyzed.

<sup>127</sup> City of Los Angeles Detail of Department Programs, Supplement to the 2021-22 Adopted Budget





22,507



2021 Number of Officers:




Police-to-**Resident Ratio:** 


1.29:1,000



2021 General Fund Marina PD Allotment:

35.6%129





<sup>129</sup> City of Marina, CA 2021-2022 and 2022-2023 Adopted Budget

<sup>130</sup> Marina PD dispatched officers to 44,296 calls for service between 2020-2022. After removing 11,022 administrative calls, duplicates, or incomplete calls, there were 33,274 calls analyzed.

#### Oakland, CA



2021 Population:

433,823



2021 Number of Officers:

**792** 



Police-to-**Resident Ratio:** 

1.8:1,000




2021 General **Fund Oakland** PD Allotment:


44.1%



2021 Oakland PD Patrol Budget:

of GF Allocation<sup>131</sup>





<sup>131</sup> Adopted Policy Budget, City of Oakland Fiscal Year 2019–2021

<sup>132</sup> The Oakland Police Department dispatched 1,262,402 calls for service in the three years from 2018-2020. Of those, 41.1% (519,337) were classified as administrative calls and removed from the analysis.



525,041



2021 Number of Officers:

**751** 



Police-to-Resident Ratio:

1.4:1,000




2021 General **Fund Sacramento** PD Allotment:


24.2%



2021 Sacramento PD Patrol Budget:

> 47.4% of GF Allocation<sup>133</sup>





<sup>133</sup> City of Sacramento 2020-2021 Approved Budget

<sup>134</sup> There were 1,029,715 calls for service in Sacramento between 2018-2020. After 260,900 calls were removed due to their administrative or otherwise unclassifiable nature or because officers were not dispatched, 619,625 calls remained for analysis.

#### 🕽 San Diego, CA



2021 Population:

1,381,611



2021 Number of Officers:

2,038



Police-to-**Resident Ratio:** 

1.5:1,000




2021 General Fund San Diego PD Allotment:


35.1%



2021 San Diego PD Patrol Budget:

of GF Allocation 135





<sup>135</sup> City of San Diego Analysis of the Police Department's Fiscal Year 2021 Budget

<sup>136</sup> The San Diego Police Department received 1,727,208 calls for service between 2019-2021. A total of 569,848 administrative calls were removed during analysis, as were four duplicate calls. San Diego did not indicate which calls were dispatched.

#### Stockton, CA



2021 Population:

322,120



2021 Number of Officers:

485



Police-to-**Resident Ratio:** 

1.5:1,000




2021 General **Fund Stockton** PD Allotment:


54.9%



2021 Stockton PD Patrol Budget:

39.5% of GF Allocation<sup>137</sup>





<sup>137</sup> City of Stockton FY 2020-21 Annual Budget





499,127



2021 Number of Officers:

2,232




Police-to-**Resident Ratio:** 


4.5:1,000



2021 General Fund Atlanta PD Allotment:

32.6%139





<sup>139</sup> City of Atlanta 2022 Budget

<sup>140</sup> Between May 2021-January 2024, Atlanta received 1,140,255 calls for service. A total of 49,620 officer-initiated stops and 166,021 administrative calls were removed during analysis.

#### Cincinnati, OH



2022 Population:

309,513



2022 Number of Officers:

1,059



Police-to-**Resident Ratio:** 

3.4:1,000




2022 General **Fund Cincinnati** PD Allotment:


35.7%



2022 Cincinnati PD Patrol Budget:

66.8% of GF Allocation<sup>141</sup>





<sup>141</sup> Cincinnati Fiscal Year 2023 Approved All Funds Budget Update

<sup>142</sup> Cincinnati received 1,652,061 unique calls for service between 2021-2023. After removing calls that were not dispatched, calls that did not have incident descriptions, administrative calls, and officer-initiated calls, there were 417,023 calls remaining.

## 🎗 Las Vegas, NV



2022 Population:

646,790



2022 Number of Officers:

3,386



Police-to-**Resident Ratio:** 

**5.2:1,000** 



2022 General Fund Las Vegas PD Allotment:

40.3%



2022 Las Vegas PD Patrol Budget:

7.1% of GF Allocation 143, 144


614,904 600,000 500,000 400.000 300.000 279,207 200,000 100,000 19,939 17,996 0

Misdemeanor

Nonviolent felony Serious violent felony

Figure 31: Las Vegas CFS 2021-2023 Frequency<sup>145</sup>

Noncriminal



<sup>143</sup> LVMPD Final Budget FY 2022-2023

<sup>144</sup> City of Las Vegas, Nevada FY 2023 Final Budget

<sup>145</sup> Las Vegas received 1,039,600 calls for service between 2021-2023. After removing administrative and officer-initiated calls, 932,046 calls remained for analysis. Las Vegas did not indicate which calls were dispatched.





292,627



2022 Number of Officers:

359




Police-to-Resident Ratio:


1.2:1,000



2022 General Fund Lincoln PD Allotment:

26.2%146





<sup>146</sup> Lincoln 2022 Budget, p. 178

<sup>147</sup> After removing 420 duplicate or errored entries, Lincoln saw 355,010 calls for service from 2020–2022. A total of 29,468 administrative calls were removed during analysis. Another 8,200 calls were removed due to lack of available information regarding call type.

#### **Q** New Orleans, LA



2022 Population:

369,749



2022 Number of Officers:

1,552




Police-to-Resident Ratio:


4.2:1,000



2022 General Fund New Orleans PD Allotment:

**25.9%**<sup>148</sup>





<sup>148</sup> City of New Orleans 2021-2022 Adopted Annual Operating Budget

<sup>149</sup> Between 2021–2023, New Orleans dispatched 1,037,945 calls for service. A total of 238,412 administrative calls were removed during analysis.



1,610,000



2022 Number of Officers:

3,125



Police-to-**Resident Ratio:** 

1.9:1,000




2022 General **Fund Phoenix** PD Allotment:


42.9%



2022 Phoenix PD Patrol Budget:

**39.1%** of GF Allocation<sup>150</sup>





<sup>150</sup> Phoenix Summary Budget, 2021-22

<sup>151</sup> From 2020-2022, Phoenix emergency services received 1,972,995 calls for service. A total of 68,017 administrative calls and 210 officer initiated calls were removed during analysis. Phoenix did not indicate which calls were dispatched.

#### **Providence, RI**



2022 Population:

189,563



2022 Number of Officers:




Police-to-**Resident Ratio:** 


2.3:1,000



2022 General **Fund Providence** PD Allotment:

**17.4%**<sup>152</sup>





<sup>152</sup> City of Providence, Rhode Island Fiscal Year 2023 General Fund Budget Summary

<sup>153</sup> There were 287,912 calls for service in the City of Providence between 2021-2023. Of these, 20,956 administrative calls and 10,645 on-view calls were removed during analysis.





749,256



2022 Number of Officers:

1,766




Police-to-**Resident Ratio:** 

2.4:1,000



2021 General Fund Seattle PD Allotment:

**22.7%**<sup>154</sup>





<sup>154</sup> City of Seattle, Washington 2022 Adopted Budget

<sup>155</sup> There were 851,844 calls for service dispatched in Seattle between 2020-2022. Of those, 156,263 administrative calls and 34,325 officer-initiated calls were removed during analysis.

## **Appendix B: Cross-City Comparisons**

#### **CA Cities**

City	Berkeley	Chico	Fresno	Long Beach	Los Angeles	Marina	Oakland	Sacramento	San Diego	Stockton
2021 Population	117,145	102,338	544,510	456,062	3,849,297	22,507	433,823	525,041	1,381,611	322,120
PD Size (# of Authorized Officers FY21)	181	103	838	795	9,457	29	792	751	2,038	485
# of Officers per 1,000 '21	1.6	1.0	1.5	1.7	2.5	1.3	1.8	1.4	1.5	1.5
City General Fund Budget FY21	\$201,700,000	\$56,169,523	\$380,293,000	\$538,500,000	\$6,659,000,000	\$19,809,317	\$684,546,119	\$649,131,000	\$1,620,900,000	\$247,837,393
Police General Fund Budget FY21	\$77,223,242	\$27,393,021	\$196,356,400	\$247,102,849	\$1,760,908,714	\$7,058,270	\$301,809,379	\$156,942,626	\$568,243,558	\$136,160,466
PD's Budget % of City's GF Budget	38.3%	48.8%	51.6%	50.0%	26.4%	35.6%	44.1%	24.2%	35.1%	54.9%
Patrol Operations Budget	\$44,854,216		\$2,465,800	\$111,098,457	\$918,935,632		\$153,707,633	\$74,322,843	\$238,578,940	\$53,728,800
Patrol Budget % of General Fund of PD	58.1%		1.3%	41.3%	52.2%		50.9%	47.4%	42.0%	39.5%

#### **Non-CA US Cities**

City	Atlanta	Cincinnati	Las Vegas	Lincoln	New Orleans	Phoenix	Providence	Seattle
2022 Population	499,127	309,513	646,790	292,627	369,749	1,610,000	189,563	749,256
PD Size (# of Authorized Officers FY22)	2,232	1,059	3,386	359	1,552	3,125	441	1,766
# of Officers per 1,000 '22	4.5	3.4	5.2	1.2	4.2	1.9	2.3	2.4
City General Fund Budget FY22	\$710,036,753	\$474,100,000	\$428,558,270	\$176,683,988	\$633,800,814	\$1,426,402,000	\$539,566,355	\$1,607,088,000
Police General Fund Budget FY22	\$231,334,324	\$169,109,890	\$172,878,488	\$46,273,269	\$164,249,786	\$611,238,667	\$93,930,918	\$365,447,509
PD's Budget % of City's GF Budget	32.6%	35.7%	40.3%	26.2%	25.9%	42.9%	17.4%	22.7%
Patrol Operations Budget		\$113,044,270	\$12,318,312			\$238,937,134		
Patrol Budget %of GF of PD		67%	7%			39%		

# JUST & SAFE

HOW TO REFORM POLICE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS WHILE INCREASING PUBLIC SAFETY



